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PREFACE 
This assessment ofintemationallegal issues in infonnation operations reflects 
the combined efforts of a superb team of Department of Defense lawyers. It 
ca'uld not have been produced without the contributions of representatives of 
the General Counsels of the Army, Navy, Air Force, the National Security 
Agency and the Defense Infonnation Systems Agency, as well as the Judge Ad-
vocates General of the military services and the Legal Counsel to the Chainnan 
of the Joint ChiefS of Staff. Their insight, wisdom and persistence have not only 
been of great value but have reflected exceeding well on themselves and their of-
fices. The principal draftsman, Phillip A. Johnson (Colonel USAF, Retired), is 
owed a note of special appreciation; his scholarship and dedication were truly 
extraordinary. 
This second edition contains a number of editorial changes, refers to several 
events that have occurred since publication of the first edition, including a brief 
discussion in Section II of EUTELSAT's actions during the 1999 NATO 
bombing campaign in Yugoslavia, adds a paragraph in Section VI concerning 
the U.S.-Soviet Dangerous Military Activities Agreement, and-by popular 
demand-adds Section XI, Notes for Further Research. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. Sources and Application of Intemational Law. 
International law consists of binding legal obligations among sovereign states. 
Two of the basic principles of the international legal system are that sovereign 
states are legally equal and independent actors in the world community, and that 
they generally assume legal obligations only by affinnatively agreeing to do so. 
The most effective instruments in creating international law are international 
agreements, which may be either bilateral or multilateral. Some of these agree-
ments, such as the United Nations Charter, establish international institutions 
that the parties agree to invest with certain authority. It is also generally accepted 
that there is a body of customary international law, which consists of practices 
that have been so widely followed by the community of nations, with the under-
standing that compliance is mandatory, that they are considered to be legally 
obligatory. 
International institutions have legislative authority to create legal obligations 
for nations only when their member nations have agreed to give them that au-
thority. The most prominent example is the power of the UN Security Council 
to pass resolutions requiring individual nations to perfonn or refrain from certain 
actions in order to protect or restore international peace and security in the con-
text of a particular situation. The decisions of the International Court of Justice 
are binding upon nations that have accepted the jurisdiction of the Court and are 
parties to litigation before it. Other international institutions can also be given 
the power to impose binding obligations upon nations that agree to submit to 
their authority. In addition, certain actions of some international institutions, 
such as the International Court of Justice and the UN General Assembly, are 
considered to be persuasive evidence of the existence of principles of customary 
international law . 
As with domestic law, the primary mechanism that makes international law 
effective is voluntary compliance. Also as with domestic law, the threat of sanc-
tions is often required as well. The international legal system provides institu-
tional enforcement mechanisms such as international litigation before the 
International Court of Justice and other judicial and arbitral tribunals, as well as 
the right to petition the United Nations Security Council to authorize coercive 
measures to protect or restore international peace and security. The interna-
tionallegal system also provides self-help enforcement mechanisms such as the 
right to use force in individual and collective self-defense and the right in some 
circumstances to repudiate treaty obligations which have been violated by 
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another party. An aggrieved nation may always withdraw from voluntary rela-
tionships involving diplomatic representation and most kinds of commerce. 
Even the right to publicly complain about another nation's illegal behavior may 
provide an effective enforcement mechanism if such complaints generate diplo-
matic costs for the offending nation. 
Chief Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes once wrote, "The life of the law has 
not been logic; it has been experience." It seldom happens that a legislature fore-
sees a problem before it arises and puts into place a legislative solution before it is 
needed. More typically, legislators react to a problem that has already manifested 
itsel£ The international legal system operates in the same manner. The interna-
tional community ordinarily does not negotiate treaties to deal \vith problems 
until their consequences have begun to be felt. This is not all bad, since the solu-
tion can be tailored to the actual problems that have occurred, rather than to a 
range of hypothetical possibilities. One consequence, however, is that the re-
sulting law, whether domestic or international, may be sharply influenced by the 
nature of the events that precipitate legal developments, together \vith all their 
attendant policy and political considerations. 
The development of international law concerning artificial earth satellites 
provides a good example. If the nations had sat down with perfect foresight and 
asked themselves, "Should we permit those nations among us that have access to 
advanced technology to launch satellites into orbits that will pass over the terri-
torie~ of the rest of us and take high-resolution imagery, eavesdrop on our tele-
communications, record weather information, and broadcast information 
directly to telephones and computers within our borders?", a very restrictive 
regime of space law might have resulted. Instead, what happened was that the 
first satellites launched by the Soviet Union and the United States were seen as 
entirely benign devices engaged in scientific research, and it was also perfectly 
clear that no nation had the capability to interfere with them as they passed over 
its territory. In these circumstances, it quickly became accepted customary inter-
national law, soon enshrined in the Outer Space Treaty, that objects in orbit 
were beyond the territorial claims of any nation, and that outer space is available 
for exploitation by all. 
The history of space law contrasts sharply with that of air law. Much of the 
early development of heavier-than-air aviation coincided \vith the First World 
War, during which the military power of aircraft for collecting intelligence, at-
tacking ground forces, and bombing enemy cities was clearly demonstrated. The 
result was a highly restricted regime of air law in which any entry into a nation's 
airspace without its permission was to be regarded as a violation of its sover-
eignty and territorial integrity. 
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Similarly, we can make some educated guesses as to how the international le-
gal system will respond to information operations, but the direction that re-
sponse actually ends up taking may depend a great deal on the nature of the 
events that draw the nations' attention to the issue. If information operations 
techniques are seen as just another new technology that does not gready threaten 
the nations' interests, no dramatic legal developments may occur. If they are seen 
as a revolutionary threat to the security of nations and the welfare of their citi-
zens, it will be much more likely that efforts will be made to restrict or prohibit 
information operations by legal means. These are considerations that national 
leaders should understand in making decisions on using information operations 
techniques in the current formative period, but it should also be understood that 
the course of future events is often beyond the control of statesmen. 
The actors in the international legal system are sovereign states. International 
legal obligations and international enforcement mechanisms generally do not 
apply to individual persons except where a nation enforces certain principles of 
international law through its domestic criminal law, or in a very limited class of 
serious offenses (war crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity, and crimes 
against peace) that the nations have agreed may be tried and punished by interna-
tional criminal tribunals. 
B. Essentials of Treaty Law. 
In domestic U.S. law there are important distinctions between treaties and 
executive agreements. This distinction primarily involves issues of Constitu-
tional authority within the U.S. government, but it is of lit de importance inter-
nationally. Treaties and executive agreements are equally binding between the 
United States and the other party or parties to an international agreement. We 
will use the term "treaty" in this paper as a shorthand way of referring to all forms 
oflegally binding state-to-state international agreements. 
Treaty obligations are binding on their parties, but international law recog-
nizes certain circumstances in which a nation can regard a treaty obligation as 
being suspended, modified, or terminated. The parties can always modify or ter-
minate a treaty by mutual consent. Some international agreements expire by 
their own terms after a fixed period of time. Generally, unless the terms of the 
agreement establish a right of unilateral withdrawal, a nation may not unilater-
ally repudiate or ,vithdraw from a treaty unless it has a basis for doing so that is 
recognized under international law. Treaty obligations are reciprocal in nature. 
If one of the parties commits a material breach of its obligations under the treaty, 
the other may be entided to suspend its own compliance, or to withdraw from 
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the agreement entirely. Also, a fundamental change in circumstances may justify 
a decision by one of the parties to regard its treaty obligations as suspended or 
terminated. 
One of these fundamental changes of circumstance is the initiation of armed 
hostilities between the parties. Some international agreements specifically pro-
vide that they will remain in effect during armed conflict between the parties, 
such as law of war treaties and the United Nations Charter. Most treaties, how-
ever, are silent on whether or not they will continue to apply during hostilities 
between the parties. Many peacetime agreements facilitate tourism, transporta-
tion, commerce, and other relationships the continuation of which would be 
fundamentally inconsistent with a state of armed conflict between the parties. 
Agreements on other subjects, such as boundary settlements and reciprocal 
rights of inheritance of private property, may be unrelated to the existence of 
hostilities and may ultimately be determined to remain in full force. The issues 
involved may be particularly complicated when the treaty concerned is multilat-
eral, rather than bilateral. When two parties to a multilateral treaty are engaged 
in armed conflict, the result may well be that the effect of the treaty is suspended 
between the belligerents, but remains in effect among each belligerent and the 
other parties. We will see later in this paper that the United States is a party to a 
variety of bilateral and multilateral agreements containing obligations that may 
affect information operations. One of our tasks will be to determine as best we 
can which of these agreements are likely to remain in effect during hostilities. 
The tests we will apply are (1) whether there is specific language in the treaty ad-
dressing its effect during hostilities between the parties, and (2) if there is no such 
language, whether the object and purpose of the treaty is or is not compatible 
with a state of armed hostilities between the parties. 
C. New Legal Challenges Presented by Information Operations. 
Many traditional military activities are included in current concepts of"infor-
mation operations" and "information warfare," including physical attacks on in-
formation systems by traditional military means, psychological operations, 
military deception, and "electronic warfare" operations such as jamming radar 
and radio signals. The application of international law to these traditional kinds 
of operations is reasonably well settled. Similarly, electro-magnetic pulse (EMP) 
weapons and directed-energy weapons such as lasers, micro-wave devices, and 
high energy radio frequency (HERF) guns will probably operate in a manner 
similar enough to that of traditional weapons that one could apply existing legal 
principles to them without much difficulty. It will not be as easy to apply existing 
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international law principles to information attack, a term used to describe the use 
of electronic means to gain access to or change information in a targeted infor-
mation system without necessarily damaging its physical components. One of 
the principal forms of information attack is likely to be computer network at-
tack, or in today's vernacular, the "hacking" of another nation's computer 
systems. 
The proliferation of global electronic communications systems and the in-
creased interoperability of computer equipment and operating systems have 
greatly improved the utility of all kinds of information systems. At the same time, 
these developments have made information systems that are connected to any 
kind of network, whether it be the Internet or some other radio or hard-wired 
communications system, vulnerable to computer network attacks. Moreover, 
global communications are almost seamlessly interconnected and virtually in-
stantaneous, as a result of which distance and geographical boundaries have be-
come essentially irrelevant to the conduct of computer network attacks. The 
result is that many information systems are subject to computer network attack 
anywhere and anytime. The attacker may be a foreign state, an agent of a foreign 
state, an agent of a non-governmental entity or group, or an individual acting 
for purely private purposes. The equipment necessary to launch a computer net-
work attack is readily available and inexpensive, and access to many computer 
systems can be obtained through the Internet or through another network to 
which access is'obtained. 
One major implication is that it may be very difficult to attribute a particular 
computer network attack to a foreign state, and to characterize its intent and 
motive. For the purposes of analysis we will initially assume away issues of attri-
bution and characterization, returning to them near the end of the analysis. An-
other major implication is that an attacker may not be physically present at the 
place where the effects of the attack are felt. The means of attack may not be tan-
gibly present either, except in the form of anonymous and invisible radio waves 
or electrons. This will complicate the application of traditional rules of intern a-
tional law that developed in response to territorial invasions and attacks by 
troops, aircraft, vehicles, vessels, and kinetic weapons that the victim could see 
and touch, and whose sponsor was usually readily apparent. 
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TI. THE LAW OF WAR 
A. Essentials of the Law of War. 
The tenus "law of war" and "law of armed conflict" are synonymous. The 
latter term has the virtue that it more clearly applies to all international armed 
conflicts, whether or not they are formally declared wars. "Law of war" is 
shorter and more familiar, and we will use it in this paper. The application of the 
law of war does not generally depend on which of the parties was at fault in start-
ing the conflict. The law of war applies whenever there is a state of international 
armed conflict, and it applies in the same manner to all the parties to the conflict. 
There is a small subset of the law of war that applies to noninternational armed 
conflicts such as civil wars, but those sorts of conflict are not immediately rele-
vant to this paper and will not be discussed. As with other branches of interna-
tionallaw, the law of war is composed of treaties and customary international 
law. The United States is a party to eighteen law of war treaties, along with their 
various annexes and protocols, and several more law of war agreements are 
pending before the Senate. The United States also recognizes the existence of a 
considerable body of customary law of war. 
The general principles of the law of war have been e:l>."pressed in various ways, 
but their essence can be said to be as follows: 
• Distinction of combatants from noncombatants: With very limited excep-
tions, only members of a nation's regular armed forces are entitled to use force 
against the enemy. They must distinguish themselves from noncombatants, and 
they must not use noncombatants or civilian property to shield themselves from 
attack. Iflawful combatants are captured by the enemy they may not be pun-
ished for their combatant acts, so long as they complied with the law of war. 
They are required to be treated humanely in accordance with agreed standards 
for the treatment of prisoners of war, and they must be released promptly at the 
cessation of hostilities. Persons who commit combatant acts without authoriza-
tion are subject to criminal prosecution. 
• Military necessity: Enemy military forces are declared hostile. They may be 
attacked at will, along with their equipment and stores. Civilians and civilian 
property that make a direct contribution to the war effort may also be attacked, 
along with objects whose damage or destruction would produce a military ad-
vantage because of their nature, location, purpose, or use. A corollary of this 
principle is that noncombatants and civilian objects making no direct 
468 
Appendix 
contribution to the war effort, and whose destruction would provide no signifi-
cant military advantage to the attacker, are immune from deliberate attack. 
• Proportionality: When an attack is made against a lawful military target, col-
lateral injury and damage to noncombatants and civilian property may be un-
avoidable. Attacks may be carried out against lawful military targets even if some 
amount of collateral damage is foreseeable, unless the foreseeable collateral dam-
age is disproportionate to the military advantage likely to be attained. The mili-
tary advantage to be gained from an attack refers to an attack considered as a 
whole rather than only from isolated or particular parts of an attack. Generally, 
"military advantage" is not restricted to tactical gains, but is linked to the full 
context of war strategy. The commander ordering the attack is responsible for 
making the proportionality judgment. The calculus may be affected somewhat if 
the enemy has failed to carry out his duty to separate his troops and equipment 
from noncombatants and civilian property, since in such circumstances the de-
fender must shoulder much of the blame for any collateral damage that results. A 
corollary of the principle of proportionality is that the attacker has a responsibil-
ity to take reasonable steps to find out what collateral damage a contemplated at-
tack may cause. 
• Superfluous injury: The nations have agreed to ban certain weapons because 
they cause superfluous injury. Among these are "dum-dum" bullets, projectiles 
filled with glass or other nondetectable fragments, poisoned weapons, and laser 
weapons specifically designed to cause permanent blindness to unenhanced 
vision. 
• Indiscriminate weapons: The nations have agreed to ban certain other weap-
ons because they cannot be directed with any precision against combatants. 
Among these are bacteriological weapons and poison gas. 
• Perfidy: The law of war provides certain visual and electronic symbols to 
identify persons and property that are protected from attack. Among these are 
prisoners of war and prisoner of war camps, the wounded and sick, and medical 
personnel, vehicles, aircraft, and vessels. Any misuse of these protected symbols 
to immunize a lawful military target from attack constitutes the war crime of 
perfidy. Suppression of such acts is necessary to preserve the effectiveness of such 
symbols, since known misuse may lead the combatants to disregard them. For 
similar reasons, it is unlawful to feign surrender, illness, or death to gain an 
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advantage in combat, as well as to broadcast a false report of a cease-fire or 
armistice. 
• Neutrality: Nations not engaged in a conflict may declare themselves to be 
neutral. A neutral nation is entided to immunity from attack by the belligerents, 
so long as the neutral nation satisfies its obligation not to assist either side. If a 
neutral nation is unable or unwilling to halt the use of its territory by one of the 
belligerents in a manner that gives it a military advantage, the other belligerent 
may have a right to attack its enemy in the neutral's territory. There is consider-
able support for the argument that the concept of neutrality has no application 
during a conflict in which one of the belligerents is a nation or coalition of na-
tions authorized by the UN Security Council to use armed force to protect or 
restore international peace and security. This conclusion is based upon Article 
49 of the Charter, which provides, "The Members of the United Nations shall 
join in affording mutual assistance in carrying out the measures decided upon by 
the Security Council." In other situations, however, as when a nation uses 
armed force in individual or collective self-defense without the benefit of a Se-
curity Council mandate, it would appear that nations not involved in the con-
flict retain the option of declaring themselves to be neutral. 
B. Application to Information Operations. 
It is by no means clear what information operations techniques will end up 
being considered to be "weapons," or what kinds of information operations will 
be considered to constitute armed conflict. On the other hand, those issues may 
not end up being particularly important to the analysis oflaw of war issues. If the 
deliberate actions of one belligerent cause injury, death, damage, and destruc-
tion to the military forces, citizens, and property of the other belligerent, those 
actions are likely to be judged by applying traditional law of war principles. 
• Distinction of combatants from noncombatants: This rule grew up when 
combatants could see each other and make a judgment of whether or not to 
open fire based in part on whether or not the individual in the sights wore an en-
emy uniform. When the unit of combat came to be a vessel, tank, truck, or air-
craft, it became more important that such vehicles be properly marked than that 
their occupants wear a distinctive uniform. If a computer network attack is 
launched from a location far from its target, it may be of no practical significance 
whether the "combatant" is wearing a uniform. Nevertheless, the law ofwarre-
quires that lawful combatants be trained in the law of war, that they serve under 
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effective discipline, and that they be under the conunand of officers responsible 
for their conduct. This consideration argues for retaining the requirement that 
combatant information operations during international armed conflicts be con-
ducted only by members of the armed forces. If combatant acts are conducted by 
unauthorized persons, their government may be in violation of the law of war, 
depending on the circumstances, and the individuals concerned are atleast theo-
retically subject to criminal prosecution either by the enemy or by an interna-
tional war crimes tribunal. The long-distance and anonymous nature of 
computer network attacks may make detection and prosecution unlikely, but it 
is the firmly established policy of the United States that U.S. forces will fight in 
full compliance with the law of war. 
• Military necessity: In developed nations both military and civilian infrastruc-
tures are vulnerable to computer network attacks. During an armed conflict vir-
tually all military infrastructures will be lawful targets, but purely civilian 
infrastructures must not be attacked unless the attacking force can demonstrate 
that a definite military advantage is expected from the attack. Stock exchanges, 
banking systems, universities, and similar civilian infrastructures may not be at-
tacked simply because a belligerent has the ability to do so. In a long and pro-
tracted conflict, damaging the enemy's economy and research and development 
capabilities may well inhibit its war effort, providing a lawful basis on which to 
target such capabilities. In a short and limited conflict, however, it would be 
hard to articulate any e>'l'ected military advantage from attacking purely eco-
nomic targets. Targeting analysis must be conducted for computer network at-
tacks just as it traditionally has been conducted for attacks using traditional 
weapons. 
• Proportionality: During Desert Storm, one of the earliest targets of the 
coalition bombing campaign was the electrical power system in Baghdad. Con-
sidering the important military uses being made of electricity from that system, it 
was clearly a lawful military target. The Iraqi government then made a public 
pronouncement that the coalition's attack on the city's electrical power system 
constituted an act of attempted genocide. The logic of this position was that the 
city's sewage system depended on electric pumping stations, so when the elec-
tricity went out the sewage system backed up and created a threat of epidemic 
disease. No one took this claim very seriously, but this incident highlights the 
fact that when an attack is made on an infrastructure that is being used for both 
military and civilian purposes the commander will not be in a proper position to 
weigh the proportionality of the expected military advantage against the 
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foreseeable collateral damage unless the commander has made a reasonable effort 
to discover whether the system is being used for civilian purposes that are essen-
tial to public health and safety. This principle operates in exacdy the same way 
whether the attack is carried out using traditional weapons or in the form of a 
computer network attack. 
As stated above, the law of war places much of the responsibility for collateral 
damage on a defending force that has failed to properly separate military targets 
from noncombatants and civilian property. When military officials decide to use 
civilian infrastructure for military purposes (or vice-versa), they ought to con-
sider the fact that such action may make that infrastructure a lawful military tar-
get. There may be no choice, as when military traffic has to move on civilian 
highways and railroads. There may be litde alternative to military use of civilian 
communications systems, since it is impractical to put into place dedicated mili-
tary communications systems that have sufficient capacity to carry all military 
communications. Where there is a choice, however, military systems should be 
kept separate from infrastructures used for essential civilian purposes. 
Military command and control systems have long been recognized as lawful 
military targets. Civilian media generally are not considered to be lawful military 
targets, but circumstances may make them so. In both Rwanda and Somalia, for 
example, civilian radio broadcasts urged the civilian population to commit acts 
of violence against members of other tribes, in the case of Rwanda, or against 
UN-authorized forces providing humanitarian assistance, in the case of Somalia. 
When it is determined that civilian media broadcasts are direcdy interfering with 
the accomplishment of a military force's mission, there is no law of war objec-
tion to using the minimum necessary force to shut them down. The extent to 
which force can be used for purely psychological operations purposes, such as 
shutting down a civilian radio station for the sole purpose of undermining the 
morale of the civilian population, is an issue that has yet to be addressed authori-
tatively by the international community. 
• Superfluous injury: We are not aware that any weapon or device yet con-
ceived specifically for use in information operations has any potential for causing 
superfluous injury, but new systems should always be reviewed ,vith an eye to 
their potential for causing catastrophic and untreatable injuries to human beings 
to an extent not required by military necessity. 
• Indiscriminate weapons: The prohibition on indiscriminate weapons may 
apply to information operations techniques such as malicious logic, as when 
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malicious logic launched against a military infonnation system spreads to other 
infonnation systems being used to provide essential services to noncombatants. 
It might also apply if malicious logic spreads to infonnation systems belonging to 
neutral or friendly nations. Finally, it might be applied indirectly if the conse-
quence of a computer network attack is to release dangerous forces, such as 
opening the floodgates of a dam, causing an oil refinery in a populated area to ex-
plode in flames, or causing the release of radioactivity. 
• Perfidy: It may seem attractive for a combatant vessel or aircraft to avoid be-
ing attacked by broadcasting the agreed identification signals for a medical vessel 
or aircraft, but such actions would be a war crime. Similarly, it might be possible 
to use computer "morphing" techniques to create an image of the enemy's chief 
of state informing his troops that an armistice or cease-fire agreement had been 
signed. If false, this would also be a war crime. 
• Neutrality: If a neutral nation permits its infonnation systems to be used by 
the military forces of one of the belligerents, the other belligerent generally has a 
right to demand that it stop doing so. If the neutral refuses, or iffor some reason it 
is unable to prevent such use by a belligerent, the other belligerent may have a 
limited right of self-defense to prevent such use by its enemy. It is quite foresee-
able, for example, that a belligerent might demand that a neutral nation not pro-
vide satellite imagery of the belligerent's forces to its enemy, or that the neutral 
cease providing real-time weather infonnation or precision navigation services. 
There appears, however, to be a limited exception to this principle for com-
munications relay systems. The primary international agreement concerning 
neutrality, the 1907 Hague Convention Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral 
Powers and Persons in Case of War on Land, to which the United States is a party, 
provides in Articles 8 and 9 that "A neutral Power is not called upon to forbid or 
restrict the use on behalf of the belligerents of telegraph or telephone cables or of 
,vireless telegraph apparatus belonging to it or to Companies or private individ-
uals," so long as such facilities are provided impartially to both belligerents. The 
plain language of this agreement would appear to apply to communication satel-
lites as well as to ground-based facilities. 
There is nothing in this agreement, however, that would suggest that it ap-
plies to systems that generate infonnation, rather than merely relay communica-
tions. These would include the satellite imagery, weather, and navigation 
systems mentioned above, as well as other kinds of intelligence-producing sys-
tems such as signals intelligence and hydrophonic systems. For example, if a 
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belligerent nation demanded that the U.S. government deny GPS navigation 
services to its enemy, and if the U.S. were unable or unwilling to comply, the 
belligerent may have the right to take necessary and proportional acts in 
self-defense, such as jamming the GPS signal in the combat area. 
International consortia present special problems. Information systems built 
around space-based components require such huge investments and access to 
such advanced technology that even developed nations prefer to share the costs 
with other nations. Where an international communications system is devel-
oped by a military alliance such as NATO, few neutrality issues are likely to arise. 
Other international consortia, however, provide satellite communications and 
weather data that are used for both civilian and military purposes, and they have 
a breadth of membership that virtually guarantees that not all members of the 
consortium will be allies in future conflicts. Some current examples are 
INTELSAT, INMARSAT, ARABSAT, EUTELSAT, and EUMETSAT. 
NATO operations in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the Spring of 1999 
present a striking case in which EUTELSAT, the majority of whose member-
ship is comprised of NATO members, after two months of the bombing cam-
paign, agreed to stop broadcasting Serbian television programs hostile to the 
NATO mission. The broadcasting at issue materially contributed to the cam-
paign of Serbian human rights violations and thus was deemed inconsistent ,vith 
EUTELSAT principles. 
Some readers may recall that there was an issue among the members of the 
INMARSAT consortium providing mobile communications services as to 
what use could be made of the system by the members' military forces under a 
provision of the INMARSAT agreement stating that the mobile communica-
tions service provided by the system could be used" exclusively for peaceful pur-
poses." This issue has largely disappeared because of the recent privatization of 
the INMARSAT system. The agreements establishing the new privatized sys-
tem continue to provide that the management and board of the new 
INMARSAT must "have regard to" certain principles, including "acting exclu-
sively for peaceful purposes, taking into account the past practices of the Organi-
zation and the practice of the Company," and that "[t]he Company shall act 
exclusively for peaceful purposes." However, this language establishes no en-
forceable obligation, and no legal remedy is provided for any third party. A re-
cent opinion by the Office of General Counsel of COM SAT, which continues 
to represent the United States in the new INMARSAT, notes that neither 
INMARSAT or INTELSAT have ever denied service to the military forces of a 
member nation, and it concludes, "COMSAT envisions no circumstances in 
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which the 'peaceful purposes' principle would be invoked as a reason to deny 
service to the u.s. Department of Defense or units thereo£" 
C. Assessment. 
There are novel features of information operations that will require expan-
sion and interpretation of the established principles of the law of war. Neverthe-
less, the outcome of this process of extrapolation appears to be reasonably 
predictable. The law of war is probably the single area of intemationallaw in 
which current legal obligations can be applied with the greatest con£dence to 
information operations. 
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ill. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL REGULATION OF THE USE OF 
FORCE IN "PEACETIME" 
A. International Law Concerning the Use of Force among Nations. 
As discussed above, the law of war authorizes a nation engaged in an interna-
tional armed conflict to employ armed force to attack lawful military targets be-
longing to the enemy. Resolutions of the United Nations Security Council 
(UNSC) may also authorize the use of armed force as provided in the UN Char-
ter. The focus of this section, however, is on the application of international law 
principles in circumstances where there is neither a state of armed conflict nor a 
UNSC mandate--i.e., in peacetime, including the conduct of military opera-
tions other than war. 
An exploration of the manner in which international law on the use of force 
among nations is likely to apply to peacetime computer intrusions will serve 
three distinct purposes: (1) it will enable a government that is resolved to con-
duct itself in scrupulous compliance with international law to avoid activities 
that are likely to be regarded by the target nation and the world community as 
violations of international law; (2) it will enable a government contemplating 
activities that might be considered to violate international law to weigh the risks 
of such actions; and (3) it will enable a government that is the victim of an infor-
mation attack to identifY the remedies afforded to it by international law, includ-
ing appeals to the Security Council, the use of force in self-defense, and other 
self-help remedies not involving the use of force. 
The frequendy-heard question, "Is a computer network attack an act of 
war?" invokes an obsolete concept not mentioned in the UN Charter and sel-
dom heard in modem diplomatic discourse. An act of war is a violation of an-
other nation's rights under international law that is so egregious that the victim 
would be justified in declaring war. Declarations of war have fallen into disuse, 
and the act of war concept plays no role in the modem international legal system. 
In any event, significant sanctions may follow from much less serious violations 
of another nation's rights that would not be regarded as acts of war. 
The members of the United Nations have agreed in Article 2 (4) of the UN 
Charter to "refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force 
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any 
other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations." 
This obligation is elaborated in the Declaration on Principles oJlnternational Law 
Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in Accordance with the 
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Charter of the United Nations, General Assembly Resolution 2625 (1970), which 
provides in part: 
• "A war of aggression constitutes a crime against the peace for which there is 
responsibility under international law." 
• "States have a duty to refrain from acts of reprisal involving the use of 
force." 
• "Every State has the duty to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting 
or participating in acts of civil strife or terrorist acts in another State or ac-
quiescing in organized activities within its territory directed towards the 
commission of such acts, when the acts referred to in the present paragraph 
involve a threat or use of force." 
• "Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as enlarging or di-
minishing in any way the scope of the provisions of the Charter concerning 
cases in which the use of force is lawful." 
NOTE: The United States has often expressed the view that most General 
Assembly resolutions are only recommendations, but that in exceptional cases 
particular General Assembly resolutions that are meant to be declaratory of in-
ternationallaw, are adopted with the support of all members, and are observed 
by the practice of states, are persuasive evidence of customary international law 
on a particular subject. Representatives of the United States have on several oc-
casions publicly endorsed the Declaration on Friendly Relations as one of the 
few General Assembly resolutions that the United States regards as an authorita-
tive restatement of customary international law, at least until the practice of 
states fails to demonstrate that they consider its principles to be legally binding. 
In its 1974 "Definition of Aggression" Resolution, the General Assembly 
further provided: 
• Article 1. Aggression is the use of armed force by a State against the sover-
eignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in 
any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations, as 
set out in this Definition. 
• Article 2. The first use of armed force by a State in contravention of the 
Charter shall constitute prima facie evidence of an act of aggression 
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although the Security Council may, in conformity with the Charter, con-
clude that a determination that an act of aggression has been committed 
would not be justified in the light of other relevant circumstances, includ-
ing the fact that the acts concerned or their consequences are not of suffi-
cient gravity. 
• Article 3. Any of the following acts, regardless of a declaration of war, shall, 
subject to and in accordance with the provisions of Article 2, qualify as an 
act of aggression: 
(a) The invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State of the territory 
of another State, or any military occupation, however temporary, re-
sulting from such invasion or attack, or any annexation by the use of 
force of the territory of another State or part thereof; 
(b) Bombardment by the armed forces of a State against the territory of 
another State or the use of any weapons by a State against the territory of 
another State; 
(c) The blockade of the ports or coasts of a State by the armed forces of 
another State; 
(d) An attack by the armed forces of a State on the land, sea or air forces, 
or marine and air fleets of another State; 
(e) The use of armed forces of one State which are within the territory of 
another State with the agreement of the receiving State, in contraven-
tion of the conditions provided for in the agreement or any extension of 
their presence in such territory beyond the termination of the 
agreement; 
(f) The action of a State in allowing its territory, which it has placed at 
the disposal of another State, to be used by that other State for perpetrat-
ing an act of aggression against a third State; 
(g) The sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irreg-
ulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another 
State of such gravity as to amount to the acts listed above, or its substan-
tial involvement therein. 
NOTE: The United States delegation noted that the text of this resolution 
reflected hard bargaining among the 35 states that were members of the Special 
Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression. Mter the resolution was 
adopted by the General Assembly without a vote, the U.S. delegation stated the 
view that the resolution did not establish rights and obligations of states, but that 
it was "likely to provide useful guidance" to the Security Council. Translated, 
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this statement appears to indicate that the United States does not regard the lan-
guage of this resolution as a completely authoritative restatement of customary 
international law, but that its essential concepts are correct. In any event, the 
question of what constitutes an "act of aggression" is unlikely to be as useful for 
our purposes as is the question, what kinds of information attacks are likely to be 
considered by the world community to be "armed attacks" and "uses offorce." 
Turning to the question of when force may lawfully be used by nations, the 
United Nations Charter provides that in some circumstances the Security 
Council may authorize the use of coercive measures, including military force: 
• Article 39. The Security Council shall determine the existence of any 
threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make 
recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance 
with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and 
security. 
• Article 41. The Security Council may decide what measures not involving 
the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and 
it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such mea-
sures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic re-
lations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of 
communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations. 
• Article 42. Should the Security Council consider that measures provided 
for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it 
may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to main-
tain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include 
demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of 
Members of the United Nations. 
Perhaps most significandy, the Charter also provides in Article 51, "Nothing 
in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective 
self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, 
until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain interna-
tional peace and security." 
Read together, these provisions of the Charter and the related General As-
sembly resolutions provide a myriad of terms and concepts concerning prohib-
ited uses of force among nations, including the threat or use of force, acts of 
aggression, wars of aggression, the use of armed force, acts of armed force, 
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invasion, attack, bombardment, and blockade. These acts may be directed at the 
victim nation's territorial integrity or political independence, or against its mili-
tary forces or marine or air fleets. They all have in common the presence of 
troops and the use of traditional military weapons. The question before us is how 
they are likely to apply to computer network attacks. 
Further, when one looks for provisions describing a sanction or remedy, only 
two provisions present themselves: the authority of the Security Council to au-
thorize various sanctions, including the use of the members' armed forces, when 
it finds there is a "threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression;" 
and Article 51's recognition of the inherent right of self defense "if an armed at-
tack occurs." 
There is no requirement that a "threat to the peace" take the form of an 
armed attack, a use offorce, or any other condition specified in the charter. The 
Security Council has the plenary authority to conclude that virtually any kind of 
conduct or situation constitutes a "threat to the peace" in response to which it 
can authorize remedial action of a coercive nature. Nothing would prevent the 
Security Council from finding that a computer network attack was a "threat to 
the peace" ifit determined that the situation warranted such action. It seems un-
likely that the Security Council would take action based on an isolated case of 
state-sponsored computer intrusion producing litde or no damage, but a com-
puter network attack that caused widespread damage, economic disruption, and 
loss of life could well precipitate action by the Security Council. The debate in 
such a case would more likely center on the offender's intent and the conse-
quences of the offending action than on the mechanism by which the damage 
was done. 
The language of Article 51, on the other hand, requires an "armed attack." A 
close parsing of the language would tend to limit its effect to attacks and inva-
sions using traditional weapons and forces. On the other hand, there is a 
well-established view that Article 51 did not create the right of self-defense, but 
that it only recognized a pre-existing and inherent right that is in some respects 
broader than the language of Article 51. 
History has also seen the emergence of such derivative doctrines as "anticipa-
tory self-defense" and "self-defense in neutral territory," both of which have 
been relied upon by the United States in certain circumstances. "Anticipatory 
self-defense" permits a nation to strike the first blow ifit has good reason to con-
clude that it is about to be attacked. The ]CS Standing Rules of Engagement im-
plement this doctrine in their authorization of the use of force in response to a 
demonstration of "hostile intent" by an adversary. "Self-defense in neutral terri-
tory" is the right to use force to neutralize a continuing threat located in the 
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territory of a neutral state, but not acting on its behalf, when the neutral state is 
unable or unwilling to fulfill its responsibility to prevent the use of its territory as 
a base or sanctuary for attacks on another nation. This doctrine has venerable 
roots in U.S. foreign and defense policy, dating at least to the Caroline incident. 
In December 1837, Canada, which was still a British colony, was fighting an in-
surrection. More than 1,000 insurgents were encamped on both the Canadian 
and U.S. sides of the Niagara River. A small steamer, the Caroline, was used by 
the insurgents to travel across and along the river. On the night of December 19, 
1837, a party of British troops crossed the Niagara and attacked the Caroline in 
the port of Schlosser, New York, setting the vessel on fire and casting it adrift 
over the Niagara Falls. One U.S. citizen was killed on the dock, another was 
missing, and several others were wounded. The United States demanded repara-
tions. The British Government responded that it had acted in self-defense. Sec-
retary of State Daniel Webster agreed that the doctrine of self-defense in neutral 
territory was a valid principle of international law, but asserted that it did not ap-
ply in the circumstances of this case. Britain continued to maintain that its action 
was legal, but nonetheless apologized for the invasion ofU.S. territory. No repa-
rations were paid. 
In 1986 the United States bombed Libya as a response to Libya's continuing 
support for terrorism against U.S. military forces and other U.S. interests. In 
June 1993 U.S. forces attacked the Iraqi military intelligence headquarters be-
cause the government of Iraq had conspired to assassinate former President 
Bush. In August 1998 U.S. cruise missiles struck a terrorist training camp in Af-
ghanistan and a chemical plant in Sudan in which chemical weapons had been 
manufactured. The rationale articulated for each of these actions was 
self-defense. Acts of self-defense "must satisfy the tests of necessity and propor-
tionality, but there is no requirement that an act of self-defense use the same 
means, or target the same type of object, or otherwise be symmetrical to the 
provocation, or that the action taken be contemporaneous with the provoca-
tion, particularly if the attacker is responding to a continuing course of conduct. 
B. Acts not Amounting to the Use afForce. 
In its 1949 decision in the Corfu Channel Case, the ICJ ruled that the intrusion 
of British warships into Albanian territorial waters, which it found to have been 
without justification under any principle of international law, constituted a vio-
lation of Albania's territorial sovereignty. The result seems to be recognition of a 
general international law of trespass, although the remedy may be limited to a 
declaratory judgment that the victim's rights have been violated. 
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The IC]'s predecessor, the Pennanent Court ofInternational Justice, in its 
1928 Chorzow Factory Decision, declared that reparations were due to any nation 
whose rights under international law were violated by another nation. This con-
cept is often referred to as the doctrine of state responsibility. 
There is also a general recognition of the right of a nation whose rights under 
international law have been violated to take countenneasures against the offend-
ing state, in circumstances where neither the provocation nor the response in-
volves the use of anned force. For example, an arbitral tribunal in 1978 ruled that 
the United States was entided to suspend French commercial air flights into Los 
Angeles after the French had suspended U.S. commercial air flights into Paris. 
Discussions of the doctrine of countenneasures generally distinguish between 
countenneasures that would otherwise be violations of treaty obligations or of 
general principles of international law (in effect, reprisals not involving the use of 
anned force) and retorsions-actions that may be unfriendly or even damaging, 
but which do not violate any international legal obligation. The use of counter-
measures is subject to the same requirements of necessity and proportionality as 
apply to self-defense. Some examples of countenneasures that have been gener-
ally accepted as lawful are the suspension of diplomatic relations, trade and com-
munications embargoes, cutting offforeign aid, blocking assets belonging to the 
other nation, and prohibiting travel to or from the other nation. 
The international law doctrines of self-defense, reprisal, and countenneasures 
all require that a nation invoking them do so with the intent of protecting itself 
against further harm, either by direcdy blocking further hostile acts against itself 
or by persuading its tonnentor to cease and desist. The motive must be protec-
tion of the nation or its citizens or other national interests from further 
hann-the satisfaction of extracting revenge, by itself, is not acceptable. These 
doctrines also demand that a state do only what is necessary and proportional in 
the circumstances. 
In summary, it appears that one trend in international law is to provide some 
kind of remedy for every violation of a nation's rights under international law. 
Some of these remedies are in the nature of self-help, such as anned self-defense, 
the interruption of commercial or diplomatic relations, or public protest. Other 
remedies may be sought from international institutions, such as an imposition of 
coercive measures by the Security Council, or a declaratory judgment or an or-
der to make reparations from an international tribunal. The issue for the victim is 
to choose the most effective available sanction. The issue for a nation contem-
plating an action that may be considered to violate the rights of another nation 
under international law is to accurately predict what sanctions such action may 
provoke. 
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C. Application to Computer Network Attacks. 
There is no way to be certain how these principles ofinternationallaw will be 
applied by the international community to computer network attacks. As with 
other developments in international law, much will depend on how the nations 
and international institutions react to the particular circumstances in which these 
issues are raised for the first time. If we were to limit ourselves to the language of 
Article 51, the obvious question would be, "Is a computer network attack an 
'armed attack' that justifies the use offorce in self-defense?" If we focused on the 
means used, we might conclude that electronic signals imperceptible to human 
senses don't closely resemble bombs, bullets, or troops. On the other hand, it 
seems likely that the international community will be more interested in the 
consequences of a computer network attack than in its mechanism. It might be 
hard to sell the notion that an unauthorized intrusion into an unclassified infor-
mation system, without more, constitutes an armed attack. On the other hand, if 
a coordinated computer network attack shuts down a nation's air traffic control 
system along with its banking and financial systems and public utilities, and 
opens the floodgates of several dams resulting in general flooding that causes 
\videspread civilian deaths and property damage, it may well be that no one 
would challenge the victim nation ifit concluded that it was a victim of an armed 
attack, or of an act equivalent to an armed attack. Even if the systems attacked 
were unclassified military logistics systems, an attack on such systems might seri-
ously threaten a nation's security. For example, corrupting the data in a nation's 
computerized systems for managing its military fuel, spare parts, transportation, 
troop mobilization, or medical supplies may seriously interfere with its ability to 
conduct military operations. In short, the consequences are likely to be more 
important than the means used. 
If the international community were persuaded that a particular computer 
network attack or a pattelu of such attacks should be considered to be an "armed 
attack," or equivalent to an armed attack, it would seem to follow that the victim 
nation would be entitled to respond in self-defense either by computer network 
attack or by traditional military means in order to disable the equipment and per-
sonnel that were used to mount the offending attack. In some circumstances it 
may be impossible or inappropriate to attack the specific means used in an attack 
(e.g., because the specific equipment and personnel used cannot be reliably 
identified or located, or an attack on the specific means used would not be effec-
tive, or an effective attack on the specific means used might result in dispropor-
tionate collateral damage). Where the specific means cannot be effectively 
attacked, any legitimate military target could be attacked, including intelligence 
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and military leadership targets, as long as the purpose of the attack is to dissuade 
the enemy from further attacks or to degrade the enemy's ability to undertake 
them. 
There has been some support for the proposition that a nation has an inherent 
right to use force in self-defense against acts that do not constitute a classic armed 
attack. This view is supported by the inclusion in the General Assembly's defini-
tion of aggression of acts that do not entail armed attacks by a nation's armed 
forces, such as the unlawful extension of the presence of visiting forces, or allow-
ing a nation's territory to be used by another state "for perpetrating an act of ag-
gression against a third State." (See pages A-8-A-ll above). U.S. practice also 
support this position, as demonstrated in the 1986 bombing ofLioyan command 
and leadership targets to persuade Libya to stop sponsoring terrorist attacks 
against U.S. interests, and in the 1993 attack on the Iraqi military intelligence 
headquarters to persuade Iraq to desist from assassination plots against former 
President Bush. A contrary view was expressed in the International Court ofJus-
tice's 1986 ruling in Nicaragua v. U.S. that the provision of arms by Nicaragua to 
the leftist rebels in El Salvador did not constitute an armed attack on El Salvador, 
so it could not form the basis of a collective self-defense argument that would 
justify armed attacks in response, such as laying of mines in Nicaraguan waters or 
certain attacks on Nicaraguan ports, oil installations and a naval base--acts that 
were "imputable" to the United States. The Court also said it had insufficient 
evidence to determine whether certain cross-border incursions by Nicaraguan 
military forces into the territory of Honduras and Costa Rica constituted armed 
attacks. The extent to which Nicaragua's conduct would justify El Salvador and 
its ally the United States in responding in ways that did not themselves constitute 
an armed attack was not before the Court. The opinion of the court nevertheless 
provides some support for the proposition that the provocation must constitute 
an armed attack before it will justify an armed attackin self-defense. It seems safe 
to say that the issue of whether traditional armed force may be used in self-de-
fense in response to provocations that are not technically regarded as armed at-
tacks is far from setded, and that the positions taken by states may be sharply 
influenced by the nature of the events concerned, together with all attendant 
policy and political considerations. 
By logical implication, to the extent that a nation chooses to respond to a 
computer network attack by mounting a similar computer network attack of its 
own, the issue of whether the initial provocation constituted an armed attack 
may become a tautology. If the provocation is considered to be an armed attack, 
the victim may be justified in launching its own armed attack in self-defense. If 
the provocation is not considered to be an armed attack, a similar response will 
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also presumably not be considered to be an armed attack. Accordingly, the ques-
tion of the availability of the inherent right of self-defense in response to com-
puter network attacks comes into sharpest focus when the victim of a computer 
network attack considers acting in self-defense using traditional military means. 
The issue may also arise if the response causes disproportionately serious effects 
(e.g., if a state responded to a computer network attack that caused only minor 
inconvenience with its own computer network attack that caused multiple 
deaths and injuries). As in all cases when a nation considers acting in self-defense, 
the nation considering such action will have to make its best judgment on how 
world opinion, or perhaps a body such as the International Court of Justice (IC]) 
or the UNSC, is likely to apply the doctrine of self-defense to electronic attacks. 
As ,vith many novel legal issues, we are likely to discover the answer only from 
e:A-perience. 
It seems beyond doubt that any unauthonzed intrusion into a nation's com-
puter systems would justify that nation at least in taking self-help actions to expel 
the intruder and to secure the system against reentry. An unauthorized elec-
tronic intrusion into another nation's computer systems may very well end up 
being regarded as a: violation of the victim's sovereignty. It may even be regarded 
as equivalent to a physical trespass into a nation's territory, but such issues have 
yet to be addressed in the international community. Furthermore, the act of ob-
taining unauthorized access to a nation's computer system creates a vulnerabil-
ity, since the intruder will have had access to the informatidn in the system and 
he may have been able to corrupt data or degrade the operating system. Accord-
ingly, the discovery that an intrusion has occurred may call into question the re-
liability of the data and the operating system and thus reduce its utility. If an 
unauthorized computer intrusion can be reliably characterized as intentional 
and it can be attributed to the agents of another nation, the victim nation will at 
least have the right to protest, probably with some confidence of obtaining a 
sympathetic hearing in the world community. 
D. An "Active Defense" against Computer Network Attacks. 
A persistent foreign intruder who gains repeated unauthorized entry into a 
nation's computer systems by defeating a variety of security measures or who 
gains entry into a number of computer systems may demand a different response. 
Such behavior may indicate both that there is a continuing danger and that coer-
cive measures are necessary to stop the intruder's pattern of conduct. Similarly, 
there may be a right to use force in self-defense against a single foreign electronic 
attack in circumstances where significant damage is being done to the attacked 
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system or the data stored in it, when the system is critical to national security or 
to essential national infrastructures, or when the intruder's conduct or the con-
text of the activity clearly manifests a malicious intent. 
Ifit is capable of doing so, in such circumstances the victim nation may be jus-
tified in launching a computer network attack in response, intended to disable 
the equipment being used by the intruder. Disabling one computer mayor may 
not defeat a state-sponsored operation. It may, however, serve as a "shot across 
the bow" warning of more serious consequences if the offending behavior con-
tinues. It is also an action unlikely to come to public attention unless one of the 
two governments announces it, making it a potentially useful measure for con-
flict avoidance. Conducting a responsive computer network attack as a measure 
of self-defense against foreign computer network attacks would have the major 
advantage that it would minimize issues of proportionality, which would be 
more likely to arise if traditional military force were used, such as firing a cruise 
missile at the building from which a computer network attack is being con-
ducted. Either response would likely be analyzed on the basis of the traditional 
criteria of necessity and proportionality. 
If it is impractical to focus an attack on the equipment used in the provoca-
tion, any legitimate military target may be attacked. The primary value of being 
able to demonstrate a ne}""Us between the provocation and the response is to be 
able to argue the likely therapeutic effect of the force used in self-defense. As a 
practical matter, the next most attractive target after the equipment used in the 
provocation may be the offending nation's communications systems, or its mili-
tary or intelligence chain of command. The consequences of a large-scale cam-
paign of computer network attacks might well justify a large-scale traditional 
military response. 
As stated above, the discussion up to this point has assumed we know who an 
intruder is, and that we are confident in characterizing his intent. In practice, this 
is seldom the case, at least in the early stages of responding to computer intru-
sions. The above legal analysis may change if the identity and location of an in-
truder is uncertain, or ifhis intent is unclear. 
Identification of the originator of an attack has often been a difficult problem, 
especially when the intruder has used a number of intermediate relay points, 
when he has used an "anonymous bulletin board" whose function is to strip 
away all information about the origin of messages it relays, or when he has used a 
device that generates false origin information. Progress has been made, how-
ever, in solving the technical problem of identifying the originator of computer 
messages, and reliable identification of the computer that originated a message 
may soon be routinely available. Attribution may also be provided by 
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intelligence from other sources, or it might be reliably inferred from the rela-
tionship of the attack to other events. 
Locating the computer used by the intruder does not entirely solve the attri-
bution problem, however, since it may have been used by an unauthorized per-
son, or by an authorized user for an unauthorized purpose. A parent may not 
know that the family computer is being used for unlawful attacks on govern-
ment computer systems. Universities, businesses, and other government agen-
cies may be similarly unaware that their computer systeins are being misused. 
The owner of a computer system may have some responsibility to make sure it is 
not being used for malicious purp.oses, but the extent of such responsibility, and 
the consequences offailing to meet it, have apparently not been addressed in any 
U.S. or foreign statute or court decision. These considerations should make us 
cautious in implementing any "active defense" system for government com-
puter systems. Nevertheless, circumstances may arise in which the urgency of 
protecting critical information systems from serious damage may warrant adop-
tion of a properly designed "active defense." 
Similarly, characterization of an intruder's intentions may be difficult. Never-
theless, such factors as persistence; sophistication of methods used, targeting of 
especially sensitive systems, and actual damage done may persuasively indicate 
both the intruder's intentions and the dangers to the system in a manner that 
would justify use of an "active defense." As with attribution, there may be useful 
intelligence on this issue from other sources, or it may be possible to reliably in-
fer the intent of the intruder from the relationship of the attack to other events. 
A determination that an intrusion originates in a foreign country would be 
only a partial solution to the attribution problem, since the attack mayor may 
not be state-sponsored. State-sponsored attacks may well generate the right of 
self-defense. State sponsorship might be persuasively established by such factors 
as signals or human intelligence, the location of the offending computer within a 
state-controlled facility, or public statements by officials. In other circumstances, 
state sponsorship may be convincingly inferred from such factors as the state of 
relationships between the two countries, the prior involvement of the suspect 
state in computer network attacks, the nature of the systems attacked, the nature 
and sophistication of the methods and equipment used, the effects of past attacks, 
and the damage which seems likely from future attacks. 
Attacks th~t cannot be shown to be state-sponsored generally do not justify 
acts of self-defense in another nation's territory. States jealously guard their sov-
ereign prerogatives, and they are intolerant of the exercise of military, 
law-enforcement, and other "core sovereign powers" by other states within 
their territory \vithout their consent. When individuals carry out malicious acts 
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for private purposes against the interests of one state from within the territory of 
a second state, the aggrieved state does not generally have the right to use force in 
self-defense against either the second state itself or the offending individual. 
Even if it were possible to conduct a precise computer network attack on the 
equipment used by such individual actors, the state in which the effects of such 
an attack were felt, ifit became aware of it, could well take the position that its 
sovereignty and territorial integrity had been violated. The general e:l-..-pectation 
is that a nation whose interests are damaged by the private conduct of an individ-
ual who acts within the territory of another nation will notify the government of 
that nation and request its cooperation in putting a stop to such conduct. 
Only if the requested nation is unwilling or unable to prevent recurrence does 
the doctrine of self-defense permit the injured nation to act in self-defense inside 
the territory of another nation. The U.S. cruise missile strikes against terrorists 
camps in Afghanistan on 20 August 1998 provide a close analogy in which the 
United States attacked camps belonging to a terrorist group located in the terri-
tory of a state which had clearly stated its intention to continue to provide a ref-
uge for the terrorists. At some point, providing safe refuge for those who 
conduct attacks against another nation becomes complicity in those attacks. At a 
minimum, the offended nation is authorized to attack its tormenters, the terror-
ists. As complicity shades into the kinds of active support and direction that are 
commonly called "state sponsorship," military and leadership targets of the host 
state may themselves become lawful targets for acts of self-defense. 
Attacks on insurgents or on terrorists and other criminals using a neutral na-
tion's territory as a refuge may also be justified when the neutral state is unable to 
satisfy its obligations. During the Vietnam war, the United States attacked North 
Vietnamese military supply lines and base camps in Cambodia after the Cambo-
dian government took the position that it was unable to prevent North Vietnam 
from making such use of its territory. This principle might justify using active 
defense measures against a computer intruder located in a neutral nation if the 
government of the neutral nation declared it had no way to locate the intruder 
and make him stop, or ifits behavior made it clear that it could not or would not 
act, or even if the circumstances did not allow time for diplomatic representa-
tions to be effective. As an analogy, it seems unlikely that a nation would com-
plain very loudly if its neighbor nation returned fire against a terrorist sniper 
firing from its territory. 
In summary, the international law of self-defense would not generally justify 
acts of "active defense" across international boundaries unless the provocation 
could be attributed to an agent of the nation concerned, or until the sanctuary 
nation has been put on notice and given the opportunity to put a stop to such 
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private conduct in its territory and has failed to do so, or the circumstances dem-
onstrate that such a request would be futile. Nevertheless, in some circumstances 
the National Command Authority (NCA) might decide to defend U.S. infor-
mation systems by attacking a computer system overseas, and take the risk of 
having to make an apology or pay compensation to the offended government. 
Among the factors the NCA would probably consider would be the danger pre-
sented to U.S. national security from continuing attacks, whether immediate ac-
tion is necessary, how much the sanctuary nation would be likely to object, and 
how the rest of the world community would be likely to respond. 
There need be less concern for the reaction of nations through whose terri-
tory or communications systems a destructive message may be routed. If only 
the nation's public communications systems are involved, the transited nation 
will nonnally not be aware of the routing such a message has taken. Even ifit be-
comes aware of the transit of such a message and attributes it to the United States, 
there would be no established principle of international law that it could point to 
as being violated. As discussed above, even during an international anned con-
flict international law does not require a neutral nation to restrict the use of its 
public communications networks by belligerents. Nations generally consent to 
the free use of their communications networks on a commercial or reciprocal 
basis. Accordingly, use of a nation's communications networks as a conduit for 
an electronic attack would not be a violation of its sovereignty in the same way 
that would be a flight through its airspace by a military aircraft. 
A transited state would have somewhat more right to complain if the attack-
ing state obtained unauthorized entry into its computer systems as part of the 
communications path to the target computer. It would be even more offended if 
malicious logic directed against a target computer had some hannful effect 
against the transited state's own equipment, operating systems, or data. The pos-
sibility of such collateral damage would have to be carefully considered by the 
state launching any such attack. If there were a high potential for such collateral 
damage to transited systems, the weapon might even be considered to be an "in-
discriminate" weapon incapable of being reliably directed against a legitimate 
target. 
There are at least two ways in which the availability of improved technology 
may affect the active-defense equation. First, it might be argued that as a govern-
ment acquires the ability to build better :firewalls and other security systems it 
will be harder to argue that an active defense is "necessary." This argument 
might be raised even if the target government has failed to install all possible 
technological security measures on the system that is under attack. This de-
manding approach to "necessity" :finds little support in the practice of nations. 
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The focus of self-defense analysis is on events as they unfold, and not as they 
might have been if different budgeting and acquisition decisions had been made 
sometime in the past. If such systems are in place, however, their apparent effec-
tiveness should be taken into account in deciding whether active defense mea-
sures are necessary. This does not mean that a nation has no right of self-defense 
where a first attempted intrusion fails, or even when a series of intrusions fail. If 
an attacker is permitted to continue mounting a campaign of such attacks it may 
learn by trial and error, it may employ other capabilities, or it may stumble onto a 
point of vulnerability. Just as an infantry unit exercising the right of self-defense 
may pursue a force that breaks off an attack and attempts to retreat until the at-
tacker ceases to be a threat, decisions on taking measures of self-defense against 
computer network attacks must take into account the extent to which an at-
tacker continues to present a threat of continuing attacks. 
Another possible implication of a defender's technological prowess may arise 
when a nation has the capacity for graduated self-defense measures. Some 
may argue that a nation having such capabilities must select a response that will 
do minimal damage. This is a variant of the argument that a nation possessing 
precision-guided munitions must always use them whenever there is a potential 
for collateral damage. That position has garnered litde support among nations 
and has been strongly rejected by the United States. There is broad recognition 
that the risk of collateral damage is only one of many military considerations that 
must be balanced by military authorities planning an attack. One obvious con-
sideration is that a military force that goes into a protracted conflict with a policy 
of always using precision-guided munitions whenever there is any potential for 
collateral damage will soon exhaust its supply of such munitions. Similarly, mili-
tary authorities must be able to weigh all relevant military considerations in 
choosing a response in self-defense against computer network attacks. These 
considerations will include the probable effectiveness of the means at their dis-
posal, the ability to assess their effects, and the "fragility" of electronic means of 
attack (i.e., once they are used, an adversary may be able to devise defenses that 
will render them ineffective in the future). In the process of reasoning by analogy 
to the law applicable to traditional weapons, it must always be kept in mind that 
computer network attacks are likely to present implications that are quite differ-
ent from the implications presented by attacks with traditional weapons. These 
different implications may well yield different conclusions. 
It may be possible to specify certain information systems that are vital to na-
tional security-both government systems and key civilian infrastructure sys-
tems. This process should serve both to give such systems high priority for 
security measures and also to identify a class of systems any attack on which 
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would immediately raise the issue of whether an active defense should be em-
ployed. This should not, of course, eliminate consideration of using an active 
defense against attacks on systems not on such a "vital systems" list where the 
circumstances justify such action. For example, a vigorous attack that threatens 
to overwhelm an information system not on the "vital systems" list but that per-
forms an important national security function could be a more valid occasion to 
use active defense measures than would be a trivial and easily defeated attack on a 
designated "vital system." A list of "vital systems" would serve primarily as an 
alert mechanism that would bring about a prompt high-level evaluation of all 
the circumstances. 
In addition, it would be useful to create a process for determining when the 
response to a computer intrusion should shift from the customary law enforce-
ment and counter-intelligence modes to a national defense mode. Such a process 
should include (1) a statement of general criteria to be applied; (2) identification 
of officials or agencies that will be involved in making the decision; and (3) pro-
cedures to be followed. 
There are of course a variety of treaty obligations that will have to be consid-
ered before adopting an "active defense" against foreign computer network at-
tacks, and these will be discussed below. There are also a variety of domestic legal 
concerns that will have to be addressed, and these will be discussed in the com-
panion assessment of domestic law issues in information operations. 
E. Assessment. 
It is far from clear the extent to which the world community will regard com-
puter network attacks as "armed attacks" or "uses offorce," and how the doc-
trines of self-defense and countermeasures will be applied to computer network 
attacks. The outcome will probably depend more on the consequences of such 
attacks than on their mechanisms. The most likely result is an acceptance that a 
nation subjected to a state-sponsored computer network attack can lawfully re-
spond in kind, and that in some circumstances it may be justified in using tradi-
tional military means in self-defense. Unless the nations decide to negotiate a 
treaty addressing computer network attacks, which seems unlikely anytime in 
the near future, intemationallaw in this area will develop through the actions of 
nations and through the positions the nations adopt publicly as events unfold. 
U.S. officials must be aware of the implications of their own actions and state-
ments in this formative period. 
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IV. SPACE LAW 
A. Introduction. 
International law regulating activities in outer space is important to the infor-
mation operator because space segments are critical to so many important infor-
mation systems. These systems perform such functions as communications relay, 
imagery collection, missile warning, navigation, weather forecasting, and signals 
intelligence. In fact, it can be said that at the current stage of space activity, the 
exclusive functions of both military and civilian satellites are to gather and relay 
information. In the conduct of information operations, there will be strong im-
peratives to interfere with the space-based information systems belonging to an 
adversary, and to defend one's own. 
One approach to attacking space systems is by targeting their ground stations. 
Another approach is to jam or "spoof' their communications links. Such actions 
are subject to the normal international law principles governing other terrestrial 
activity. Sometimes, however, it may be more effective to attack the satellite or 
satellites that form the space segment of the system . .As we will see, activities in 
space are subject both to general principles of international law and to a number 
of treaty obligations that apply specifically to space activities. 
B. Space Law Treaties. 
There is probably no other field of human endeavor that produced so much 
international law in such a short period. Within twenty years after the first Sput-
nik launch in 1957, international diplomatic conferences produced four major 
widely-accepted multilateral space law treaties. Taken together, these treaties 
provide the foundations of existing space law. 
• The Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and 
Use Of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (the Outer 
Space Treaty, 1967) 
• The Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, Return of Astronauts, and the Retllm 
of Objects Launched into Outer Space (the Rescue and Return Agreement, 
1968) 
• The Convention on International Liability for Damages Caused by Space Objects 
(the Liability Convention, 1972) 
492 
Appendix 
• The Convention on the Registration cif Objects Launched into Outer Space (the 
Registration Convention, 1975) 
Note: There is another treaty called the Moon Agreement of1979 which the 
United States has never signed and which has attracted only 9 parties, among 
whom only France is active in space operations. In addition, several provisions 
of the 1980 Environmental Modification Convention apply to space activity. 
These agreements are not direcdy relevant to information operations, however, 
and they will not be discussed further here. 
The four major space treaties together establish the following principles that 
are direcdy relevant to information operations. These principles have been so 
,videly accepted that they are generally regarded as constituting binding custom-
ary international law, even for non-parties to these agreements. 
• Space is free for exploration and use by all nations. It is not subject to na-
tional appropriation by claim of sovereignty, use, occupation, or any other 
means. 
• Activities in space shall be conducted with due regard for the interests of 
other states. 
• States that launch space objects are liable for any damage they may do in 
space, in the air, or on the surface of the Earth. Different standards ofliabil-
ity are established for damage done to other items in space, for which a 
"fault" standard applies, and damage done on the surface of the Earth and 
to aircraft in flight, for which absolute liability applies. 
• Space activities are subject to general principles of international law, in-
cluding the UN Charter. 
Several conclusions are apparent from these general principles. The first is 
that the rules on the use offorce discussed in Section III of this paper apply fully 
to activities in outer space. Among these are that nations are obliged not to use 
force in their relations with each other unless they are acting in self-defense or 
when authorized to do so by the UN Security Council. Once again, however, as 
with other forms of information operations, one has to consider what actions by 
or against objects in space will be considered to be uses offorce. The world com-
munity would probably not hesitate to regard as a use offorce the destruction of 
a satellite by a missile or a laser. It would probably react similarly if it could be 
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proven that one nation took over control of another nation's satellite by elec-
tronic means and caused it to fire its retro rockets and fall out of orbit. In such a 
case, the consequences will probably matter more than the mechanism used. 
The reaction of the world community to lesser kinds ofinterference is hard to 
predict. For example, if one nation were able by electronic means to suspend the 
operations of another nation's satellite for a brief period, after which it returned 
to service undamaged, it seems likely that the world community would consider 
such action as a breach of the launching nation's sovereign rights, but not as a use 
of armed force. 
One could argue, however, that this argument is unimportant because the 
space treaties create a specific obligation not to interfere with the space activities 
of other nations, and to pay reparations for any damages resulting from such in-
terference. This argument appears to have considerable force, at least in peace-
time. During an international armed conflict between the two nations 
concerned, however, the law of armed conflict would apply unless it was 
trumped by the principle of noninterference with space systems. Resolution of 
this issue depends largely on whether the four space treaties will be considered to 
apply during an armed conflict. None of them has any specific provision that in-
dicates whether the parties intended that the agreement apply in wartime. 
There appears to be a strong argument that the principle of noninterference 
established by these agreements is inconsistent with a state of hostilities, at least 
where the systems concerned are of such high military value that there is a strong 
military imperative for the adversary to be free to interfere with them, even to 
the extent of destroying the satellites in the system. As indicated in the discussion 
of treaty law in the introduction to this paper, the outcome of this debate may 
depend on the circumstances in which it first arises in practice. Nevertheless, it 
seems most likely that these agreements will be considered to be suspended be-
tween the belligerents for the duration of any armed conflict, as least to the ex-
tent necessary for the conduct of the conflict. 
If the principle of noninterference is regarded as suspended for the period of 
the conflict, it also seems likely that the liability provisions in these agreements 
would also be suspended, at least between the parties. This would not, however, 
excuse the belligerents from liability to neutral nations if their actions caused 
damage to their citizens or property 
c. Specific Prohibitions of Military Activities in Space. 
There is a popular notion that military activities in space are prohibited-that 
space is a place a little closer to heaven into which the nations have agreed not to 
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introduce weapons and human conflict. There is a germ of truth in this notion, 
supported by high flights of rhetoric in international fora, but the existing treaty 
restrictions on military operations in space are in fact very limited. These restric-
tions are included in both the space treaties listed above and in various arms con-
trol agreements. 
The Outer Space Treaty provides that the parties will not "place in orbit 
around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of 
weapons of mass destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies [i.e., the 
moon, planets, and asteroids], or station such weapons in outer space in any 
other manner." The treaty permits placing in orbit weapons other than nuclear 
weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. Also, the treaty contains no 
prohibition against nuclear weapons transiting outer space, as long as they do not 
enter into an earth orbit and they do not explode in outer space. 
The Outer Space Treaty also prohibits the establishment of military bases, the 
testing of weapons, and the conduct of military maneuvers on the moon or other 
celestial bodies. It permits these activities in orbit around the Earth, and in other 
places in outer space. Similarly, there is no prohibition against establishing mili-
tary space stations or operating other satellites with offensive or defensive 
capabilities. 
The Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and 
Under Water (the Limited Test Ban Treaty, 1963) prohibits all nuclear explosions 
in outer space. Accordingly, a party to this agreement may not lawfully explode 
a nuclear device in outer space in order to disable an adversary's satellites by 
means of the electro-magnetic pulse generated by a nuclear explosion, or by its 
other effects. A nation operating its own satellite systems is unlikely to take such 
an action in any event, since its own satellites would be subject to the same ef-
fects as those belonging to its adversary. 
The Treaty on tlte Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (the ABM Treaty, 
1972) provides that no party may" develop, test or deploy space-based ABM sys-
tems or components." 
Under a 1997 theater missile defense (TMD) agreement not yet ratified by 
the Senate, the United States and Russia have agreed not to place in space theater 
missile defense interceptor missiles "or space-based components based on other 
physical principles, whether or not part of a system, that are capable of substitut-
ing for such interceptor missiles." 
A number of arms control agreements provide that no party will interfere 
with the others' "national technical means of verification." Translated, this 
means no interference \vith the orbiting imaging systems used to monitor the 
strategic arms of another party. 
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Read together, these agreements pennit the development, testing, and de-
ployment of anti-satellite and satellite-defense systems unless they involve either 
the stationing or testing of nuclear devices in outer space or the orbiting of sys-
tems that also have ABM or ATM capabilities. Their use is subject only to (1) the 
general principles of international law relating to the use offorce; (2) the princi-
ple of non-interference with the space systems of other nations in peacetime, 
subject to the right to use force in self-defense and when authorized by the UN 
Security Council; (3) the law of war during international armed conflicts; and (4) 
obligations under relevant arms-control agreements not to interfere ,vith other 
parties' national technical means of verification. This leaves a very broad range of 
pennissible "space-control" systems and operations. 
In a non-nuclear conflict, the parties might very well detennine that the 
treaty prohibitions against placing nuclear weapons in orbit, against e}.1'loding 
nuclear devices in outer space, and against placing ABM components and ATM 
interceptors in orbit remain consistent with a state of limited armed conflict. 
Those obligations may well serve to avoid escalation of the conflict to the nu-
clear leveL The parties' conclusions as to the obligation not to interfere ,vith 
other parties' national technical means of verification will probably depend to a 
great extent on the circumstances of the conflict. 
D. Domestic Law and Policy. 
A federal statute, 18 USC 1367, makes it a felony to intentionally or mali-
ciously interfere with a communications or weather satellite, or to obstruct or 
hinder any satellite transmission. The application of this statute to national secu-
rity information operations is discussed in the companion assessment of domes-
tic legal issues. 
U.S. domestic policy on developing space control capabilities has been in-
consistent at best. By the early 1980s the U.S. Air Force had developed an 
anti-satellite missile with an explosive warhead that was carried aloft by an F-15 
fighter and launched at high altitude. A test of this system was conducted in 1985 
against a U.S. satellite whose useful life had e}.1'ired. Congress soon thereafter 
decreed that no appropriated funds were to be used to test any weapon against an 
object in orbit. In 1987 the USAF program was tenninated. At the time, it ap-
peared that members of Congress voting for the ban had done so for a variety of 
reasons, among which were: (1) support for the broad principle that space should 
be free from human conflict; (2) dismay that the first test had generated 285 
pieces of trackable space debris; (3) concern that further testing of an 
anti-satellite capability might interfere with continuing strategic arms control 
496 
Appendix 
negotiations; and (4) concern that the United States should not press ahead with 
testing an anti-satellite system when the nation had yet to decide where its own 
long-term interests lie. Concerning this last point, it was obvious that there is a 
military interest in being able to defend your own space systems and having the 
ability to interfere ,vith your adversary's, but there was also a contrary consider-
ation that the long-term interests of the United States-as the nation that de-
pends most heavily on space systems-may be better served by promoting the 
development of a regime ofinternationallaw that prohibits any interference by 
one nation with the space systems of another, and inhibits the acquisition of the 
capability to do so. That fundamental debate has yet to be pursued to a definitive 
conclusion. 
Later, when public attention was drawn to the possible use of lasers as 
anti-satellite weapons, Congress prohibited the use of appropriated funds to illu-
minate any object in orbit with a laser. This restriction was removed in 1995. In 
October 1997 the U.S. Army conducted a test in which it illuminated an Air 
Force satellite nearing the end of its useful life with the MIRACL laser, located 
at White Sands, New Mexico. Despite public announcements that the purpose 
of the experiment was purely defensive in nature--to observe the effects of the 
laser on the satellite's optical sensors in order to better protect U.S. satellites from 
deliberate or accidental laser illumination-a public furor ensued. Shortly there-
after President Clinton exercised his short-lived item veto authority to delete 
funds from the FY 98 DoD Authorization Act for development of an Army Ki-
netic Energy Anti-Satellite Missile and two other projects that he considered to 
be related to space control. Congress approved additional funds for space control 
projects in the FY 1999 DoD Authorization Act and urged expenditure of the 
FY 98 funds that were restored after the Supreme Court ruled that the item veto 
was unconstitutional. 
At this point, it seems fair to say that the United States has not arrived at a con-
sensus on the fundamental policy issues concerning space control. It seems likely 
for the near future that the development of such systems will continue, with re-
newed controversy to be expected as soon as a decision is imminent on the de-
ployment, or even advanced testing, of an operational system. . 
E. International Efforts to Control "Weaponization of Space". 
Over the last decade there has been strong support in the UN General Assem-
bly for negotiation in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) of a draft treaty 
banning weapons in space. The most recent action by the General Assembly was 
its adoption on 4 December 1998 by a vote of 165-0-4 of a resolution entided 
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"Prevention of an arms race in outer space." This resolution calls for reestablish-
ment by the CD of an Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race 
in Outer Space that existed in prior years. Canada and Egypt are actively pro-
moting consideration of a "no weapons in space" treaty in the CD, but so far 
they have garnered litde active support among the other CD members. Both 
Russia and China have also announced their support for negotiations to ban 
"weaponization of space," but neither has advanced a specific proposal with 
much vigor. In summary, there appears to be widespread lukewarm support for 
the general idea of a treaty banning an "arms race in space," but the subject en-
joys a low priority at the moment and no draft treaty has garnered significant 
support. This may all change if and when a nation or nations are known to have 
deployed operational space control systems, or are on the verge of doing so. 
Chinese and Russian support for a ban on "weaponization of space" is seen in 
some quarters as ironic, since China is reported to be developing a ground-based 
anti-satellite laser system and Russia is the only nation known to have once had 
an operational anti-satellite missile. There have been a number of reports that 
the Soviet Union developed a "co-orbital ASAT" that was launched into orbit, 
where it maneuvered close enough to a target satellite to destroy the target by 
exploding. Reportedly, the Soviet system was tested against objects in space 20 
times and became operational in 1978. Russia consistendy denied that it had 
tested or deployed such a system until September 1997, when press reports indi-
cate that President Yeltsin said in a letter to President Clinton that Russia at one 
time possessed an anti-satellite capability, but that it had since "renounced" it. 
F. Assessment. 
There is no legal prohibition against developing and using space control 
weapons, whether they would be employed in orbit, from an aircraft in flight, or 
from the Earth's surface. The primary prohibition is against weapons that entail 
the placing of nuclear weapons in orbit or that would employ a nuclear eX1Jlo-
sion in outer space. The use of space control systems in peacetime would be sub-
ject to both the general principles of international law and to treaty obligations 
not to interfere with other nations' space systems and national technical means of 
verification. These obligations would probably be suspended during an interna-
tional armed conflict, during which the parties' conduct would be governed pri-
marily by the law of war. U.S. domestic policy on space control, however, is at 
best unsetded. 
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v. COMMUNICATIONS LAW 
A. International Communications Law. 
International communications law consists primarily of a number of bilateral 
and multilateral communications treaties. The most significant of these treaties is 
the International Telecommunications Convention of 1982 (lTC), which has over 
140 parties and which became effective for the United States in 1986. This 
agreement, often referred to as the Nairobi Convention, is the latest in a series of 
widely adhered to multilateral telecommunications conventions signed in this 
century, which were preceded by multilateral agreements in the late 1800s pro-
viding protection for submarine cables. The current series of agreements estab-
lishes the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), which has the status 
of a specialized agency of the United Nations, and they invest the ITU with the 
authority to formulate telegraph and telephone regulations which become bind-
ing legal obligations upon formal acceptance by ITU member nations. These 
agreements also establish mutual legal obligations among the parties, several of 
which are directly relevant to information operations. 
Perhaps the most significant of these obligations is in Article 35, which pro-
vides that ali radio "stations, whatever their purpose, must be established and op-
erated in such a manner as not to cause harmful interference to the radio services 
or communications of other Members or of recognized private operating agen-
cies, which carry on radio service, and which operate in accordance with the 
provisions of the Radio Regulations." "Harmful interference" is defined in An-
nex 2 to the Convention as "interference which endangers the functioning of a 
radio navigation service or of other safety services or seriously degrades, ob-
structs or repeatedly interrupts a radio communication service operating in ac-
cordance ,vith the Radio Regulations." One of the clearest violations of this 
provision would be the jamming or "spoofing" of a radio navigation service. 
Without speculating on all the possible permutations of the application of this 
provision to the broad range of information operations, suffice it to say that this 
provision on its face would appear to restrict many such operations that involve 
the use of radio broadcasting. 
On the other hand, Article 38 of the ITC provides a specific exemption for 
military transmissions: "Members retain their entire freedom with regard to 
military radio installations of their army, naval and air forces." In July 1994, 
when the United States was considering broadcasting messages to the Haitian 
people from U.S. military aircraft in international airspace urging them not to set 
out to sea in hazardous vessels, the Office of Legal Counsel in the Department of 
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Justice relied on the military exemption in Article 38 as one of several bases for 
determining that the ITC does not prohibit such activity. Article 38 goes on to 
say, "Nevertheless, these installations must, so far as possible, observe ... the 
measures to be taken to prevent harmful interference, and the provisions of the 
Administrative Regulations concerning the types of emission and the frequen-
cies to be used, according to the nature of the service performed by such installa-
tions." While this provision indicates that military installations do not have carte 
blanche to interfere with civilian communications, the phrase "so far as possi-
ble," read together with the specific exemption for military radio installations, 
provides considerable room to maneuver for information operations conducted 
by military forces. 
The ITC also provides specific authority for its member nations to interfere 
with international telecommunications in certain circumstances: 
• Article 19 allows members to "stop the transmission of any private tele-
gram which may appear dangerous to the security of the State or contrary 
to their laws, to public order or to decency, provided that they immedi-
ately notify the office of origin of the stoppage of any such telegram or part 
thereof, except when such notification may appear dangerous to the secu-
rity of the State." 
• Article 19 also permits members to "cut off any other private telecommu-
nications which may appear dangerous to the security of the State or con-
trary to its laws, to public order or to decency." 
• Article 20 reserves the right of members "to suspend the international tele-
communication service for an indefinite time, either generally or only for 
certain relations and/or certain kinds of correspondence, outgoing, in-
coming or in transit, provided that it immediately notifies such action to 
each of the other Members through the medium of the Secretary-
General." 
Finally, it seems clear that the lTC's provisions apply primarily in peacetime. 
The treaty does not specifically state how-if at all-it will apply during an 
armed conflict. Nevertheless, there is ample precedent in which nations have 
demonstrated conclusively that they regard the provisions of international com-
munications conventions as being suspended between belligerents engaged 
in armed conflicts. Prior to the First World War, for example, all the major Eu-
ropean nations were parties to the 1884 Convention for Protection of Submarine 
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Cables. The first day of the war, the British Navy pulled up and cut the five major 
submarine cables serving Germany. Throughout all the wars of this century, 
communications facilities of all sorts have been regarded as priority military tar-
gets. Since some of the parties to the ITC and other multilateral communica-
tions conventions are likely to be neutrals in armed conflicts between other 
nations, the result may become somewhat complicated. Most ITC obligations 
will be considered to be suspended among the belligerents, but they will remain 
in effect between each belligerent and the neutral parties to the agreement, as 
well as among the neutral parties. 
Note: The issue of the extent to which a neutral nation or an international 
communications consortium may continue to provide communications services 
to a belligerent is discussed in the law of war section of this paper. 
The United States has negotiated bilateral communications only selectively, 
primarily because the ITC and the ITU provide a framework for handling most 
international communications issues. As one might expect, the need for bilateral 
communications agreements has arisen for the United States primarily with 
Canada and Mexico, because of the potential for interference in broadcast com-
munications across our common borders. A number of bilateral communica-
tions agreements have also been negotiated between the United States and 
nations where U.S. military forces are stationed. There is a potential for such bi-
lateral agreements to either restrict or facilitate information operations by U.S. 
military f~rces. The agreements concerned should be consulted when such an is-
sue arises. 
B. Domestic Communications Law. 
The ITC and its predecessors obligate each Member nation to suppress acts by 
individuals or groups within its territory that interfere with the communications 
of other members. In partial satisfaction of this obligation, in 1934 Congress en-
acted 47 USC 502, which provides, "Any person who willfully and knowingly 
violates any rule, regulation, restriction, or condition ... made or imposed by 
any international radio or wire communications treaty or convention, or regula-
tions annexed thereto, to which the United States is or may hereafter become a 
party, shall, in addition to any other penalties provided by law, be punished, 
upon conviction thereof, by a fine of not more than $500 for each and every day 
during which such offense occurs." In October 1993, when the United States 
was considering broadcasting radio messages to the people of Haiti supporting 
the return of democracy in that nation, the Office of Legal Counsel of the De-
partment of Justice concluded in a written opinion that 47 USC 502 would not 
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apply to the actions of u.s. military members acting on behalf of the President 
pursuant to the President's foreign affairs and Commander-in-Chief authority. 
c. Assessment. 
International communications law contains no direct and specific prohibi-
tion against the conduct of information operations by military forces, even in 
peacetime. The established practice of nations provides p~rsuasive evidence that 
telecommunications treaties are regarded as suspended among belligerents dur-
ing international armed conflicts. Domestic communications laws do not pro-
hibit properly authorized military information operations. Accordingly, neither 
international nor domestic communications law appears to present a significant 
barrier to information operations by u.s. military forces. 
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VI. IMPLICATIONS OF OTHER TREATIES 
The State Department's most recent published list of international agree-
ments to which the United States is a party, TREATIES IN FORCE, January 1, 
1998, is 495 pages long. The United States is a party to literally thousands of mul-
tilateral and bilateral international agreements. From their sheer numbers, one 
would think it inescapable that lurking somewhere in those agreements are pro-
visions that '\vill affect particular information operations activities. This section 
attempts only to highlight certain kinds of "typical" agreements that are likely to 
contain obligations relevant to the conduct of information operations. 
A. Mutual Legal Assistance Agreements. 
Mutual legal assistance agreements (sometimes called judicial assistance 
agreements) obligate each party to gather and provide evidence located in its ter-
ritory concerning litigation or criminal prosecutions that occur within the juris-
diction of another party requesting such assistance. The United States is a party 
to several dozen mutual legal assistance agreements. Some of these agreements 
apply only to the management of particular litigation or to certain types of of-
fenses such as drug trafficking and money laundering. Only a few mutual legal 
assistance agreements apply broadly to all law enforcement investigations and 
prosecutions. Such an agreement may supply the only domestic legal authority 
for the assisting party to investigate offenses that did not occur within its jurisdic-
tion, and it also establishes procedures that expedite the requested assistance. To 
be effective in helping to suppress computer crimes and other high-tech of-
fenses, mutual legal assistance agreements must either expressly cover such of-
fenses or they must apply broadly to all crimes. 
B. Extradition Agreements. 
Extradition agreements obligate the parties in certain circumstances to deliver 
persons accused of crime to the other party for criminal prosecution. The 
United States is a party to more than a hundred bilateral extradition treaties, as 
well as to a 1933 Convention on Extradition to which thirteen nations in the 
Americas are parties. If no extradition treaty is in effect, a national government 
often '\vill have neither an international obligation nor the domestic authority to 
deliver custody of an individual to another nation for the purpose of prosecu-
tion. It is important that the list of offenses covered by such agreements include 
computer intrusions and other high-tech crimes. In addition, the effectiveness 
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of extradition treaties is often frustrated by provisions providing that the re-
quested nation will not extradite its own citizens, or that it will not extradite per-
sons who commit crimes for political reasons. 
NOTE: The Department of Justice has undertaken a major initiative ,vith 
the "G8" countries (the other seven being the United Kingdom, Germany, Ja-
pan, Italy, Canada, France, and Russia) to modernize the domestic criminal law 
of each nation to adequately provide for the investigation and prosecution of 
computer intrusions and other high-tech crimes, and to put into place any 
needed improvements to international agreements providing for mutual legal 
assistance and extradition. In December 1997 the Attorney General hosted a 
meeting of the G8 Justice and Interior Ministers to discuss these issues, and a 
number of follow-up working group meetings have been held since that time. 
The United States has also participated in a project undertaken by the Council of 
Europe to draft an international convention on "cyber-crime." Recently the 
United States undertook similar efforts in the Organization of American States 
and at the United Nations. 
C. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). 
Many provisions of this treaty, which is before the Senate for advice and con-
sent, are considered to express customary international law. Some of the provi-
sions discussed here are among them, and are therefore considered to be binding 
on all nations whether or not they are parties to the Convention. Others consti-
tute new obligations. One principle widely accepted as existing customary in-
ternationallaw is the obligation in Article 19 for a vessel exercising the right of 
innocent passage through a nation's territorial sea not to engage in activities 
"prejudicial to the peace, good order, or security of the coastal State." The prej-
udicial activities listed in Article 19 include: 
• "any threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or 
political independence of the coastal State, or in any other manner in viola-
tion of the principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the 
United Nations 
• any act aimed at collecting information to the prejudice of the defence or 
security of the coastal State 
• any act of propaganda aimed at affecting the defence or security of the 
coastal State 
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• any act aimed at interfering with any systems of conununication or any 
other facilities or installations of the coastal State" 
Once UNCLOS is in general effect, these restrictions on activities aboard 
vessels in a coastal state's territorial sea will be of relatively minor importance be-
cause UNCLOS limits the width of the territorial sea a nation can claim to 
twelve nautical miles. At present, a number of nations claim territorial seas as 
,vide as 200 miles. The twelve-mile limitation on the width of the territorial sea, 
together with other important guarantees UNCLOS establishes for the free op-
eration of military aircraft and vessels, have led DoD to strongly support ratifica-
tion ofUNCLOS. 
Article 109 ofUNCLOS provides that all "States shall co-operate in the 
suppression of unauthorized broadcasting from the high seas" and defines 
unauthorized broadcasting, for the purposes of the Convention, as "the trans-
mission of sound radio or television broadcasts from a ship or installation on the 
high seas intended for reception by the general public contrary to international 
regulations." The international regulations referred to consist primarily of the 
provisions of the Nairobi Convention and the ITU's Radio Regulations dis-
cussed in section V of this paper. This provision, which is generally regarded as 
establishing new law, was designed to deal with "pirate radio" broadcasting from 
vessels and platforms on the high seas, which became a significant problem for a 
number of countries in the 1960s. These broadcasts were primarily conunercial 
in nature; by operating from the high seas they escaped the coastal state's regula-
tion and taxation. Article 109 confers jurisdiction to prosecute persons en-
gaged in pirate radio broadcasts upon the state whose flag the ship flies, the state 
where a broadcasting installation is registered, the state of which the broadcast-
ing person is a citizen, any state where the transmissions can be received, and any 
state where authorized radio conununication is suffering interference. Article 
109 also provides that any state havingjurisdiction to prosecute may "arrest any 
person or ship engaged in unauthorized broadcasting and seize the broadcasting 
apparatus." 
Article 113 requires parties to adopt domestic criminal legislation punishing 
willful or culpably negligent damage to submarine cables belonging to other 
parties by ships or persons under their jurisdiction. 
These UNCLOS provisions have the potential to affect only a narrow cate-
gory ofinformation operations, but they will have to be considered when deci-
sions are made concerning those operations to which they do apply, at least in 
peacetime. UNCLOS does not e:ll..-pressly address how it will apply during an in-
ternational armed conflict. In accordance with the general principles discussed 
505 
An Assessment of International Legal Issues 
in the introduction to this paper, provisions determined to be incompatible ,vith 
a state of armed conflict will be regarded as suspended among the belligerents. 
The established practice of nations leaves no doubt that Article 19' s regime gov-
erning innocent passage through the territorial sea will be suspended between 
belligerents. The same can be said with a high degree of confidence concerning 
Article 113's protections for submarine cables. Article 109's provisions for the 
suppression of unauthorized radio broadcasting from the high seas are relatively 
new, with litde established practice. Analytically, there would seem to be litde 
reason to suspend its application to commercial broadcasters during an armed 
conflict, but it would almost certainly not apply to broadcasts from the high seas 
conducted by a belligerent for military or diplomatic purposes. 
D. Treaties on Civil Aviation. 
The United States is a party to a number of treaties concerning civil aviation, 
the most significant of which is the 1944 Convention on International Civil Avia-
tion. This treaty, which has more than 180 parties, is often referred to as the Chi-
cago Convention. It establishes the International Civil Aviation Organization 
(ICAO) and provides the basic legal framework for international civil aviation. 
The Convention does not direcdy apply to state aircraft, except for the obliga-
tion stated in Article 3 (d): "The contracting States undertake, when issuing reg-
ulations for their state aircraft, that they will have due regard for the safety of 
navigation of civil aircraft." This concern for safe navigation by civil aircraft is 
also reflected in Article 28, which provides that each party will provide naviga-
tion and communications services as agreed upon through ICAO procedures, 
and in Article 37, which provides that the parties will comply ,vith "interna-
tional standards and recommended practices and procedures" on a variety of 
subjects including communications systems and air navigation aids. Over the 
years the ICAO Council has developed and adopted 18 technical Annexes to the 
Chicago Convention. Annex 10, Aeronautical Telecommunications, contains 
agreed provisions on aeronautical communications, navigation and surveillance. 
While military aircraft are not direcdy bound by these provisions, their obliga-
tion of "due regard" for the safety of civil aircraft generally includes an obliga-
tion not to interfere with these systems. 
The United States is currendy engaged in negotiations in ICAO concerning 
the role to be played by the Global Positioning System in future navigation sys-
tems for international civil aviation. In particular, an accommodation must be 
reached between ICAO's interest in ensuring that navigation services essential 
to the safety of international civil aviation are not interrupted during an armed 
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conflict, and the military imperative for the United States to be able to deny the 
use ofGPS to a military adversary. Similar issues are certain to arise in the future 
in which information operations activities may create implications for the safety 
of international civil aviation. 
The Chicago Convention is rare among multilateral treaties in that it has a 
specific provision concerning its application during armed conflict. Article 89 
provides, "In case of war, the provisions of this Convention shall not affect the 
freedom of action of any of the contracting States affected, whether as 
belligerents or as neutrals. The same principle shall apply in the case of any con-
tracting State which declares a state of national emergency and notifies the fact to 
the Council." Upon reflection, however, this provision is unlikely be applied as 
broadly as its language indicates. It seems clear that many provisions of the Con-
vention are inconsistent with a state of armed conflict. The most obvious is the 
principle that aircraft not engaged in scheduled airline service have the right to 
free passage into or through the airspace of other parties. Other provisions do 
not appear to be incompatible with a state of armed conflict among some of the 
parties. For example, the existence of a state of armed conflict among certain 
parties should not be regarded as suspending the belligerents' obligation to carry 
out their combatant activities with due regard for the safety of civil aviation. Ac-
cordingly, Article 89 does not provide much help in deciding what provisions of 
the Convention will remain applicable during an armed conflict, and resort will 
still be required to the general principle that only those obligations that are in-
compatible ,vith a state of armed conflict will be suspended, and only among the 
belligerents. 
E. Treaties on Diplomatic Relations. 
The United States is a party to the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Rela-
tions, a widely adhered to treaty establishing obligations among its parties con-
cerning the treatment of diplomatic personnel and premises. Among the 
protections afforded a party's diplomatic mission in the territory of another state 
are the right to inviolability of the premises of the mission (Article' 2); its "ar-
chives and documents" (Article 24); the private residences, papers, correspon-
dence, and property of diplomatic agents (Article 30); and diplomatic 
communications (Article 27). The treaty further provides that the mission may 
communicate with its government and other missions and consulates of its gov-
ernment by "all appropriate means, including diplomatic couriers and messages 
in code or cipher. However, the mission may install and use a wireless transmit-
ter only with the consent of the receiving State." Conversely, the treaty imposes 
507 
An Assessment of International Legal Issues 
certain duties on diplomatic missions. Article 41 provides that personnel of the 
mission must respect the laws and regulations of the receiving state, that they 
must not interfere in the receiving state's internal affairs, and that the "premises 
of the mission must not be used in any manner incompatible ,vith the functions 
of the mission as laid down in the present Convention or by other rules of gen-
eral international law or by any special agreements in force between the sending 
and the receiving State." Article 45 provides that the duties of the receiving state 
continue in force even in the case of armed conflict between the parties, or if 
diplomatic relations are broken offbetween them, even though the staff of the 
mission is recalled. Planning for any information operations activity that in-
volves diplomatic premises, persons, archives, documents, or communications, 
either as an instrument or as a target of the operation, must take into account 
these international legal obligations. 
F. Treaties of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation. 
The United States is a party to a large number of bilateral agreements ,vith 
other nations providing reciprocal arrangements for expedited tourism, trade, 
and transportation between the parties. These agreements have various titles, 
and their provisions differ somewhat. Most such agreements do not contain spe-
cific provisions on telecommunications, and they constitute perhaps the arche-
type of agreements that are likely to be regarded as suspended during an armed 
conflict because their provisions expediting free travel and trade between the 
parties are incompatible with hostilities between them. Nevertheless, planning 
for information operations, especially in peacetime, should include a review of 
all significant international agreements between the United States and any other 
nation that may be affected. 
G. Status of Forces and Stationing Agreements. 
When the military forces of one nation are present in the territory of another 
nation with its consent, it is customary for the nations involved to execute writ-
ten agreements establishing the rights and obligations of the parties concerning 
the visiting forces. "Stationing agreements" establish the consent of the host na-
tion to the presence of foreign troops; set agreed limits on their numbers, equip-
ment, and activities; and identify facilities for their use. These topics may also be 
dealt with in a "defense cooperation agreement" or some other agreement pro-
viding for the overall defense relationship between the parties. It is also common 
for the parties to execute a "status of forces" agreement (SOFA) that addresses 
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the allocation of various kinds oflegal jurisdiction over the visiting forces. The 
best known of these agreements is the 1951 Agreement Between the Parties to the 
North Atlalltic Treaty Regardillg the Status of Their Forces (NATO SOFA). As of the 
end of1998 the United States was a party to 103 SOFAs, most of which follow 
the general pattern of the NATO SO FA. SOFAs are necessary because of an 
overlap oflegal jurisdiction exercised by the sending and receiving states. The 
receiving state has jurisdiction over persons and activities in its territory, while 
the sending state has both the right and the duty to exercise control over its 
armed forces, which is clearly a core sovereign function. 
Since the full concurrent exercise of the normal jurisdiction of the sending 
and receiving states is impractical, status of forces agreements allocate criminal 
and civil court jurisdiction between the sending and receiving states, and also ex-
empt the visiting force and its members from certain taxes, customs fees and pro-
cedures, immigration formalities, and most host nation licensing and inspection 
requirements. Typically, an administrative claims procedure is established for 
personal injuries and property damage caused by the visiting force. Another 
common provision requires that the visiting force and its members "respect" the 
host nation's laws. (This requirement will be discussed in detail in the next sec-
tion of this paper). The NATO SOFA is implemented in most NATO countries 
by separate, more detailed, bilateral supplementary agreements, and by numer-
ous other bilateral agreements on specific subjects including communications. 
These agreements contain provisions that must be taken into account if U.S. 
military forces intend to engage in information operations activities while pres-
ent in the territory of the receiving state. 
• For example, many such agreements require that the United States notify the 
host nation of any significant change in the capabilities or uses of installations 
made available for the use of U.S. military forces. lfU.S. authorities intend to 
conduct information operations activities from such installations, a determina-
tion must be made as to whether the relevant agreements require notifYing the 
host nation, and perhaps even requesting its consent. 
• Stationing agreements often provide that the visiting U.S. forces may install 
and use various communications equipment, but they often provide as well that 
such equipment must not interfere with host nation communications systems 
and that it must be used in accordance with host nation laws and regulations. If 
this equipment is to be used for information operations activities, it must be de-
termined whether the contemplated activities are consistent with these 
obligations. 
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• Many stationing agreements authorize or even obligate the visiting force to 
use the receiving state's military and civilian communications systems. Com-
monly, there are obligations that any u.s. use of host nation communications 
systems must not cause interference and that such use must be in accordance 
with host nation laws and regulations. The potential for information operations 
to cause interference with the host nation's communications system and the pos-
sible application of host nation laws and regulations must be carefully consid-
ered, along with the fact that the conduct of offensive information operations 
through host nation communications systems may subject them to possible 
countermeasures and acts of self-defense in peacetime, and may make them le-
gitimate military targets during an armed conflict. 
Finally, if a host nation discovers that its territory and facilities have been used 
without its knowledge as a base for U.S. information operations of a nature that 
may tend to involve it against its will in a conflict or dispute, U.S. diplomatic and 
military relationships with the host nation are likely to suffer. The host nation 
could well take the view that in principle there is little difference between using 
an ally's territory to launch air strikes and using it to launch computer network 
attacks or other information operations activities. As a practical matter, com-
puter network attacks are much more difficult to identify, trace, and attribute. 
However, it will not always be impossible to do so, particularly when informa-
tion on such attacks is available from intelligence sources. Accordingly, deci-
sions concerning whether to conduct information operations from the territory 
of an ally, and especially whether to do so without the host nation's knowledge 
and consent, must be made at senior policy levels. 
H. U.S.,Soviet Dangerous Military Activities Agreement. 
During the Cold War there were a number of incidents in which U.S. and 
Soviet forces followed each other closely in international waters and airspace, es-
pecially during military exercises, and sometimes physically interfered ,vith each 
other's operations. Lest these incidents inadvertently escalate into an armed con-
frontation, onJune 11, 1988 the Chairman of the Joint ChiefS of Staff and the 
Soviet Chief of General Staff issued a joint statement in which they declared 
their intent to avoid dangerous military activities in the vicinity of each other, 
and onJuly 11, 1988 the United States and the Soviet Union signed the Agree-
ment on the Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities. In Section 1 (d) of Article II 
of that agreement, the parties agreed that, when operating in proximity to per-
sonnel and equipment of the armed forces of the other party during peacetime, 
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they will not interfere "with command and control networks in a manner which 
could cause harm to personnel or damage to equipment of the armed forces of 
the other Party." Article I, Section 9 of the agreement defines "interference 
with command and control networks" as "actions that hamper, interrupt or 
limit the operation of the signals and information transmission means and sys-
tems providing for the control of personnel and equipment of the armed forces 
of a Party." The United States has recognized the Russian Federation as a suc-
cessor state to the Soviet Union for purposes of this agreement. The question of 
succession under this agreement by other nations that were part of the Soviet 
Union has not been authoritatively addressed. In the rather narrow circum-
stances in which this agreement applies, it remains a binding intemationallegal 
obligation. 
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vn. FOREIGN DOMESTIC LAWS 
A. Introduction. 
Laws enacted by other nations may have important implications for informa-
tion operations activities conducted by U.S. military forces. U.S. criminal stat-
utes addressing computer-related offenses, space activities, communications, 
and the protection of classified information all raise important issues for informa-
tion operations. Similarly, foreign laws affecting U.S. information operations 
activities will most likely also consist of criminal statutes. 
The sophistication of foreign domestic law on high-tech activities varies 
enormously, and it will continue to do so for the foreseeable future. The more 
technologically advanced countries tend to be more aware of the dangers cre-
ated by computer hackers and other high-tech criminals, so they typically take 
the lead in putting legislation into place to criminalize such behavior. It is no ac-
cident that the Justice Department's international program to promote appro-
priate changes to mutual legal assistance treaties and other nations' domestic 
laws, which was discussed in Section VI of this paper, concentrated first on the 
G8 countries and the Council of Europe. There are other important variables at 
work besides technological advancement, however, including each nation's 
public opinion and policy positions concerning high-tech offenses, especially 
computer hacking. There are persons in every country, including the United 
States, who regard hackers as essentially hannless pranksters. There is a 
well-established minority view that the Internet and all the computer systems 
connected to it should be free game, and that defeating attempts to gain unre-
stricted access to these resources or imposing regulations on personal conduct on 
the Internet are repressive violations of the hackers' civil liberties. The argument 
is even advanced that hackers provide valuable assistance to the operators of the 
computer systems they attack, by revealing vulnerabilities that otherwise might 
have been exploited by sinister persons with malicious motives. On the interna-
tional scene, there is the additional factor that many individuals love to see one of 
their fellow citizens succeed in pulling the tail of richer and more powerful na-
tions, especially the United States. 
As a result, the state of domestic laws dealing with high-tech misconduct var-
ies enormously from country to country. This has important implications for 
U.S. information operations for two basic reasons: (1) The state of a nation's do-
mestic criminal law directly impacts the assistance that the nation's public offi-
cials can provide in suppressing certain behavior by persons operating in its 
territory; and (2) The state of a nation's domestic criminal law may have a 
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significant effect on U.S. infonnation operations conducted in the nation's terri-
tory or involving communications routed through the nation's communications 
systems. 
B. Cooperation in Investigations and Prosecutions. 
It should be readily apparent that law enforcement officials cannot prosecute 
an individual for conduct that is not defined as a crime in the applicable criminal 
law. It may be less obvious, but equally important, that in most constitutional 
governments law enforcement officials may not use their authority to conduct 
criminal investigations unless the alleged conduct constitutes a crime. If a hacker 
in Country X uses the Internet to gain access to a DoD computer in the Penta-
gon, copies sensitive data, deletes or corrupts data, and installs malicious logic, 
the law enforcement officials of Country X may be able to assist in investigating 
that conduct and may be able to extradite the offender to the United States only 
if one or more of the hacker's actions constitute a crime under that nation's law. 
Even where such legislation exists, the legal system may still not be able to pro-
vide either extradition or meaningful criminal punishment, as occurred in the 
case of a young Israeli hacker given a suspended sentence by an Israeli court after 
he participated in a series of unlawful intrusions into DoD computer systems in 
early 1998. 
The domestic laws of some nations may also permit the use of devices specifi-
cally designed to frustrate attempts to trace Internet communications to their 
source. Since geography is essentially irrelevant to communications on the 
Internet, devices such as anonymous remailers, which strip off all infonnation 
about the originator of a message, make it possible for a hacker located anywhere 
-even in the United States or other country-to avoid identification by rout-
ing his or her message through the anonymous remailer. In this way, weaknesses 
in the domestic law of one state may provide impunity to hackers everywhere. 
The weakest link therefore threatens law enforcement even in countries with 
robust and sophisticated laws. Accordingly, the imperative to bring domestic 
laws in every nation up to a reasonable standard should be readily apparent. 
C. Effect of Foreign Domestic Law on Actions of u.s. Information 
Operators. 
If a CINC or aJTF commander decides to order execution of a certain infor-
mation operations activity by forces under his or her command who are de-
ployed in a foreign country, the commander may have to consider whether or 
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not such activity is prohibited under local law. The answer may be important at 
two different levels of analysis: (1) The individuals who issue or execute such an 
order might be subject to prosecution in a host nation criminal court; and (2) 
The commander might feel obligated on a policy basis to refrain from issuing 
such an order. 
If a U.S. military member issued an order or performed an act in the course of 
his or her official duties overseas that was a crime under host nation law, the 
member could very well be subject to prosecution in a host nation criminal 
court. Under many SOFAs, an act done in the course of a military member's of-
ficial duties falls within the primary right to exercise jurisdiction of the sending 
state, but that rule applies only when the conduct constitutes an offense under 
the law ofboth nations, or only under U.S. law. Where the conduct alleged con-
stitutes an offense only under the law of the host nation, the host nation has ex-
clusive jurisdiction to prosecute. The United States has consistently taken the 
position that it would be intolerable for a U.S. military member to be criminally 
prosecuted for performing an act that is legal under applicable U.S. law, such as 
the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), and which he or she was in-
structed to perform in the execution of an official duty. A similar issue arose re-
cently in connection with the adoption by several NATO member nations of 
domestic laws making it a crime to possess anti-personnel land mines (APLs). 
There is no similar crime under the UCl'vij. In several cases, the nations con-
cerned have agreed to permit the U.S. forces to retain their APL stockpiles in the 
host nation's territory for at least some period of time. In these cases, either spe-
cific exemptions from the host nation law or agreed screening procedures for 
prosecutions have had to be devised to prevent prosecutions of U.S. military 
members for performing their official duties. 
In practice, such prosecutions are most unlikely because if U.S. military au-
thorities become aware that performance of certain information operations 
within the territory of a specific host nation, or that produce harmful effects 
within its territory, will subject military personnel to possible host nation crimi-
nal prosecution, those U.S. military authorities are most unlikely to order that 
such operations be conducted. The result will be that U.S. forces are unable to 
conduct certain activities they would otherwise conduct, or perhaps they will 
have to use forces elsewhere to conduct the operation. The issue thus becomes 
not so much one of the prospect of criminal prosecution of individual service 
members but rather of a limitation on the conduct of U.S. information 
operations. 
This consideration may be not only a policy issue- it may involve binding legal 
obligations under a status offorces or similar agreement. For example, Article II of 
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the NATO SO FA provides, "It is the duty of a force and its civilian component 
and the members thereof as well as their dependents to respect the law of the re-
ceiving State .... " Similar language appears in most other SOFAs to which the 
United States is a party. Considerable practice has accumulated concerning the 
application of this obligation to "respect" the law of the receiving state. It has of-
ten been argued that the drafters could have said the visiting force must "com-
ply" ,vith host nation law but instead chose the less definite term "respect." The 
product of almost fifty years of U.S. practice in implementing SOFAs world-
wide appears to be that U.S. visiting forces will generally observe the content of 
host nation law, but are exempt from the law's procedural requirements such as 
licensing, inspection, and reporting. If U.S. visiting forces seek to avoid the ap-
plication of the substance of a foreign law, they generally request the host nation 
to grant them a specific exemption or at least to reach an understanding that a 
particular host nation law will not be enforced against the visiting forces. 
If a contemplated information operation activity appears to conflict with host 
nation law, the commander concerned might choose to consult with host nation 
officials in an effort to resolve the issue. If time or other circumstances do not 
permit such consultations, the commander should carefully consider whether 
the activities in question should be conducted by forces outside the territory of 
the host nation concerned, and in a manner that would not make use of or affect 
that nation's communications systems. U.S. military and diplomatic authorities 
should be able to manage host nation legal issues if we identify them early on and 
carefully consider the available courses of action. 
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VITI. IMPLICATIONS OF ESPIONAGE LAW 
A brief review of the treatment of espionage under international law may be 
instructive in predicting how the international community will react to infor-
mation operations, especially in those mission areas in which the same technical 
capabilities may be used for both espionage and information operations, and also 
in other areas where reasonably persuasive analogies present themselves. 
A. Espionage under International Law. 
For our present purposes, espionage may be defined as the covert collection 
of intelligence about other nations: Espionage is a much narrower topic than 
"intelligence," much of which is collected via open source information, volun-
tary exchanges of information among nations, and technical means such as satel-
lite imagery and signals intelligence that are generally accepted as legal by the 
international community. Roughly stated, covert methods of collecting intelli-
gence are in most cases designed to go undetected by their target, and if detected 
they are designed to be unattributable to the sponsoring state. Nevertheless, dis-
covery, attribution, and public disclosure occur fairly often. 
B. Espionage during Armed Conflict. 
The treatment of spies during armed conflict is well established in the law of 
war. A "spy" is defined in the law of war as any person who, when acting clan-
destinely or under false pretenses, obtains or endeavors to obtain information in 
the area controlled by a belligerent, with the intention of communicating it to a 
hostile party. A spy may be a military member or a civilian, and his or her citizen-
ship is irrelevant. Military personnel wearing their own uniforms are not consid-
ered to be spies, even if they engage in collecting intelligence behind enemy 
lines. Only a person gathering intelligence while relying on protected civilian 
status or while wearing an enemy uniform is considered to be a spy under the law 
of war. Accordingly, information operations during an armed conflict will not 
raise any issue of spying under the law of war unless they involve the presence of 
individuals inside enemy-controlled territory who (1) are engaged in collecting 
information with the intent of communicating it to a hostile party, and (2) are 
wearing civilian clothing or enemy uniforms. It seems highly unlikely that the 
notions of" electronic presence" or "virtual presence" will ever find their way 
into the law of war concept of spying, for two reasons: (1) If an individual is not 
physically behind enemy lines he or she is not subject to capture during the 
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mission; and (2) There will be no issue of acting under false pretenses by abusing 
protected civilian status or by wearing the enemy's uniform. This will exclude 
most information operations activities from being considered espionage in war-
time. Nevertheless, behind-the-lines missions to collect information, or to in-
stall devices that enable the collection of information, may well raise wartime 
spying issues. 
If caught in enemy territory, a spy can be punished, after an appropriate trial, 
under the domestic law of the captor. The punishment can include the death 
penalty. The nation on whose behalf the spy was acting, however, will not be 
considered to have violated any intemationallegal obligation. In addition, ifin-
dividuals who may have engaged in espionage but successfully complete their 
missions (that is, they have returned to friendly lines) and subsequently are cap-
tured while not engaged in acts of spying, they may not be punished for their 
previous acts of espionage. 
c. Espionage in Peacetime. 
Unlike the relatively well developed treatment of espionage under the law of 
war, there is very little authority on the treatment of espionage under interna-
tionallaw in peacetime. There have of course been many domestic criminal tri-
als of peacetime spies in many countries, including the United States. By 
contrast, there has been almost no activity concerning peacetime espionage 
,vithin the international legal system except for public complaints and the expul-
sion of implicated diplomats. This may be because the primary harm done to the 
victim nation consists of the fact that certain secret information has been com-
promised, which is a more abstract and indirect type of injury than dead or in-
jured citizens, property damage, or invasions of territory. The lack of strong 
international legal sanctions for peacetime espionage may also constitute an im-
plicit application of the international law doctrine called" tu quoque" (roughly, a 
nation has no standing to complain about a practice in which it itself engages). 
Whatever the reasons, the international legal system generally imposes no sanc-
tions upon nations for acts of espionage except for the political costs of public 
denunciation, which don't seem very onerous. 
The consequences for individuals caught spying, however, can be very seri-
ous. Such individuals can be tried for whatever crimes their conduct may consti-
tute under the victim nation's domestic law, whether charged as espionage, as 
unlawful entry into its territory, or as a common crime such as burglary, murder, 
theft, bribery, obtaining unauthorized access to state secrets, or unauthorized 
computer intrusions. This fact accounts to some extent for the widespread 
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practice of assigning intelligence operatives to embassy staff positions in which 
they enjoy diplomatic immunity from prosecution. The only remedy for an of-
fended host nation is to declare such persons to be persona non grata, which ob-
ligates the sending nation to remove them from the country. 
The treatment of espionage under international law may help us make an 
educated guess as to how the international community will react to information 
operations activities. As discussed in Section III of this paper on the use of force, 
international reaction is likely to depend on the practical consequences of the 
activity. Iflives are lost and property is destroyed as a direct consequence, the ac-
tivity may very well be treated as a use of force. If the activity results only in a 
breach of the perceived reliability of an information system, it seems unlikely 
that the world community will be much exercised. In short, information opera-
tions activities are likely to be regarded much as is espionage-not a major issue 
unless significant practical consequences can be demonstrated. 
That leaves the issue of the possible criminal liability of an information opera-
tor who may later come into the custody of a nation that has been the victim of 
an operation in which he or she has engaged. As vlith a spy, there is no evident 
theoretical reason why such an individual could not be prosecuted for violation 
of the victim nation's criminal laws. As a practical matter, however, the prob-
lems of detection and attribution of information operations activities at the na-
tionallevel are daunting; the likelihood of being able to prove in court that an 
individual engaged in a certain information operations activity-while not im-
possible-seems small. 
Finally, it deserves mention that there is an established division of labor 
within the u.S. government between the intelligence community and the uni-
formed military forces concerning "covert action." Generally speaking, the in-
telligence community conducts covert action operations in peacetime that do 
not consist of traditional military activities. It remains to be seen how informa-
tion operations activities will fall within this division oflabor, especially when 
they are associated with military operations other than war. 
D. Assessment. 
Information operations activities are unlikely to fall "vithin the definition of 
spying in wartime, although a limited category of activities related to informa-
tion operations may so qualifY. Information operations activities are more likely 
to fall within the category of peacetime espionage. Perhaps more importandy, 
the reaction of the world community to information operations that do not 
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generate widespread dramatic consequences is likely to be very similar to its re-
action to espionage, which has traditionally been tepid. 
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IX. INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO RESTRICT 
"INFORMATION WARFARE" 
As soon as the concept of "information warfare" began to receive broad press 
coverage, discussion began of negotiating a treaty that would prohibit or restrict 
it. A draft treaty text that circulated on the Internet in 1995 said simply, "The 
Parties to this Convention agree not to engage in information warfare against 
each other." The first public governmental initiative was a resolution tabled by 
Russia in the UN's First Committee in October 1998 that apparently reflected a 
serious effort to get the UN to focus on the subject. The Russian resolution in-
cluded a call for states to report their views regarding the "advisability of elabo-
rating international legal regimes to ban the development, production and use of 
particularly dangerous information weapons." The United States has taken the 
position that it is premature at this point to discuss negotiating an international 
agreement on information warfare, and that the energies of the international 
community would be better spent on topics of immediate concern such as help-
ing each other to secure information systems against criminals and terrorists. So 
far there has been little support expressed for the Russian initiative. 
There are both similarities and differences between the concept of a treaty to 
ban or restrict information warfare and similar efforts to prohibit "weapon-
ization of space." One similarity is the political reality that nations lacking a sig-
nificant new military capability that they perceive will be dominated by a few 
wealthy and powerful states have a strong incentive to agree to ban or restrict 
that capability. There may be an even greater incentive to prevent interference 
with information systems, which all nations possess to some degree, than \vith 
space systems, in which only 30 nations are currently active and which are domi-
nated by the United States, Russia, and the European Space Agency. On the 
other hand, the number of nations that have any reasonable expectation of de-
veloping their own space control systems anytime soon can be counted on the 
fingers of one hand, while anyone with a desk-top computer and an Internet 
connection thereby has access both to hacker tools and to a wide variety ofim-
portant information targets worldwide. Accordingly, as nations appraise where 
their long-term national interests lie, the calculus is quite different as between 
international legal restriction of the "weaponization of space" and similar con-
trol of information warfare. With space systems, most states do not e:"'Pect to be 
either an attacker or a defender in the near future. With information systems, all 
states can reasonably expect to be both. 
As with space control, the United States has not yet addressed fundamental 
policy decisions about where its long-term interests lie in connection \vith the 
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possible international legal restriction of ibfonnation operations. On the one 
hand, there is an obvious military interest in being able to interfere with an ad-
versary's infonnation systems, and in being able to protect one's own. Used as an 
instrument of military power, infonnation operations capabilities have the sig-
nificant advantage that they minimize both collateral damage and friendly losses 
of personnel and equipment. Their use may avoid unwanted escalation of a dis-
pute or conflict. They are relatively cheap and require much less in the way of 
forward basing, deployment, and logistical support than do traditional weapons 
and their delivery platforms. 
On the other hand, as the nation that relies most heavily on advanced infor-
mation systems, the United States has the greatest vulnerability to attack. This 
concern would seem to drive U.S. policymakers to consider the merits of inter-
national restrictions on infonnation operations. If we could negotiate an effec-
tive international ban on certain types of infonnation operations activities, 
might signing such a treaty best serve our long-tenn national interests? 
The subject ofinfonnation operations is of course much more complex than 
that of space control, since there are so many more infonnation systems subject 
to attack, so many more ways of attacking them, so many more potential players, 
plus constant rapid changes in the relevant systems and technologies. As we have 
learned in our internal U.S. policy deliberations, there are great difficulties in 
even agreeing on definitions of what ought to be included in discussions of "in-
fonnation warfare" and "infonnation operations." In these circumstances, it 
seems unlikely that there will be much enthusiasm anytime soon for negotiating 
an international agreement that would significandy restrict infonnation 
operations. 
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x. OBSERVATIONS 
There seems to be litde likelihood that the international legal system will soon 
generate a coherent body of "information operations" law. The most useful ap-
proach to the international legal issues raised by information operations activities 
will continue to be to break out the separate elements and circumstances of par-
ticular planned activities and then to make an informed judgment as to how ex-
isting international legal principles are likely to apply to them. In some areas, 
such as the law of war, existing legal principles can be applied with considerable 
confidence. In other areas, such the application of use of force principles to 
adopting an "active defense," it is much less clear where the international com-
munity will come out, and the result will probably depend more on the per-
ceived equities of the situations in which the issues first arise in practice than on 
legal analysis. The growth of international law in these areas will be gready influ-
enced by what decision-makers say and do at those critical moments. 
There seems to be no particularly good reason for the United States to sup-
port negotiations for new treaty obligations in most of the areas of international 
law that are direcdy relevant to information operations. The principal exception 
is international criminal cooperation, where current U.S. efforts to improve 
mutual legal assistance and extradition agreements should continue to receive 
strong emphasis. Another idea that might prove fruitful is to negotiate a treaty to 
suppress "information terrorism," but there seems to be litde concept at present 
how such an agreement would operate or how it would reliably contribute value 
to information assurance and critical infrastructure protection. 
There are no "show-stoppers" in international law for information opera-
tions as now contemplated in the Department of Defense. There are, however, 
many areas where legal uncertainties create significant risks, most of which can 
be considerably reduced by prudent planning. Since so many of these potential 
issues are relatively novel, and since the actions taken and public positions an-
nounced by nations will strongly influence the development of international law 
in this area, the involvement of high-level policy officials in planning and exe-
cuting information operations is much more important at present than is the case 
with more traditional military activities. 
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XI. NOTES FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
I. INTRODUCTION 
There are many te:x.1:books and casebooks that provide general surveys of intern a-
tionallaw. Some of the more recent of these are: 
Ian Brownlie, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (4th ed. 1990) 
Barry E. Carter & Phillip R. Trimble, INTERNATIONAL LAW (1991) 
Stephen Dycus, Arthur L. Berney & William C. Banks, NATIONAL 
SECURITY LAW (2nd ed. 1997) 
Louis Henkin, Richard C. Pugh, Oscar Schachter & Hans Smit, 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (3rd ed. 1993) 
John Norton Moore, Frederick S. Tipson & Robert F. Turner, NATIONAL 
SECURITY LAW (1990) 
Malcolm N. Shaw, INTERNATIONAL LAW (4th ed. 1997) 
Useful collections of materials on U.S. practice concerning international legal is-
sues include: 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE 
UNITED STATES (1986) 
Hackworth, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 7 Volumes (1940-1943) 
Whiteman, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 15 Volumes (1963-1973) 
Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International LAw, a regular 
feature in THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW; and 
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS; both of which are publications of the 
American Society ofInternational Law. (Web site at www.asil.org) 
The United Nations Charter has been widely reprinted. It can also be found at 59 
Stat. 1031; TS 993; 3 Bevans 1153. 
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The quotation from Chief Justice Holmes appears in THE COMMON LAW 
(1881). 
Discussions of the effect of war on treaty obligations can be found in the 
following: 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE 
UNITED STATES, Vol. I 218-222 (1986) 
Whiteman, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, Vol. 14 490-510 (1970) 
Lester B. Offield & Edward D. Re, CASES AND MATERIALS ON 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 68-78 (1955) 
Ian Brownlie, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 616-617 
(1990) 
There have been relatively few books and articles published to date addressing 
international legal issues in information operations. Among these are: 
M.E. Bowman, Is International Law Ready for the Information Age? 19 
FORDHAM INT'L. L.J. 1935 (1996) 
Lawrence T. Greenberg, Seymour E. Goodman & KevinJ. Soo Hoo, OLD 
LAW FORA NEW WORLD? THE APPLICABILITY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
TO INFORMATION WARFARE (1997). Published as a monograph by the In-
stitute for International Studies, Stanford University, and in revised form in 
1998 by the Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense Uni-
versity, the latter under the tide INFORMATION WARFARE AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Sean P. Kanuck, Information Waifare: New Challenges for Public International 
Law, BAR v. INT'L. L. J. 272 (Winter 1996) 
Michael N. Schmitt, Computer Network Attack and the Use of Force in Itlterna-
tional Law: Thoughts on a Normative Framework, 37 COLUM. J. INT'L. 1. 885 
(1999) 
Roger D. Scott, Legal Aspects of Information Waifare: Military Disnlption ofTele-
communications, 45 NAVAL L. REv. 57 (1998) 
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W Gary Sharp, Sr., CYBERSPACE AND THE USE OF FORCE (1999) 
ll. THE LAW OF WAR 
The views of the U.S. military services on law of war matters are summarized in 
military publications such as the U.S. Anny's Field Manual 27-10, LAW OF 
LAND WARFARE (1956); Air Force Pamphlet 110-31, INTERNATIONAL 
LAW-THE CONDUCT OF ARMED CONFLICT AND AIR OPERATIONS 
(1976); and Naval Warfare Publication i-14M, THE COMMANDER'S 
HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS (1995). In addition, 
Burrus Carnahan has compiled a comprehensive research report on U.S. practice 
relating to customary law of war principles for use by the International Commit-
tee of the Red Cross in its ongoing study of worldwide practice relating to the 
customary law of war. Unfortunately, neither Mr. Carnahan's study nor the 
ICRC study is yet available in published form. Finally, the DoD Law of War 
Working Group chartered by DoD Directive 5100.77, "The DoD Law of War 
Program," December 1998, has for several years been composing a DoD LAW 
OF WAR MANUAL. When it is published it will constitute the most current and 
comprehensive statement of the Department's views on law of war matters. 
There are also a large number ofbooks and articles commenting on law of war is-
sues, which are far too numerous to list here. 
Information on law of war issues that arose during the 1991 Persian Gulf conflict 
can be found in Appendix 0, "The Role of the Law ofWar, " in the DoD report 
to the Congress on the conduct of the Persian GulfW ar, which is reprinted in 31 
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS (1992). 
The 1907 Hague Convention Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral 
Powers and Persons in Case ofW ar on Land is published at 36 Stat. 2310, T .S. 
540. 
EUTELSAT's actions during NATO's 1999 bombing campaign in Kosovo 
are described in Steven Pearlstein, Serb TV Gets Notice It's Canceled, WASH-
INGTON POST, May 23,1999. 
The significance of the "peaceful purpose" principle to the new 
INMARSAT is discussed in a April 15, 1999 letter from the COMSAT Cor-
poration's Office of Legal Counsel to Mobile Datacom Corporation. 
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ill. USE OF FORCE 
Indicators that the United States considers the 1970 Declaration on Friendly Re-
lations to constitute an authoritative statement of international law include 
"Statement by Richard H. Ginger, U.S. Alternate Representative to the U.N. 
General Assembly," DEPT OF STATE BULLETIN 623 (November 1970) and 
"Statement by Robert Rosenstock, U.S. Representative to the Si."th Commit-
tee (Legal)" in Boyd, DIGEST of UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1977. 
The statement by the U.S. delegation to the effect that the 1974 "Definition of 
Aggression" Resolution does not constitute an authoritative statement of inter-
national law is reported at DEPT OF STATE BULLETIN 155 (February 1975). 
The 1994 JCS Standing Rules of Engagement for U.S. Forces are published as 
Chairman of the Joint ChiefS of Staff Instruction 3121.01. Some portions of this 
publication are classified, but its discussion of the use of force in self-defense 
against "hostile intent" is unclassified. At this writing in November 1999 a re-
vised version of the SROE was nearing publication. No change is e::-"1>ected in 
the principle cited here. 
The Caroline incident is reported in many texts, one of the most detailed of 
which is 2 Moore, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 409-414 (1906). 
For an authoritative U.S. statement of the legal basis for the 1986 bombing of 
Libya, see "President's Address to the Nation," Apri114, 1986, reprinted in 
"U.S. Exercises Right of Self-Defense against Libyan Terrorism," DEPT OF 
STATE BULLETIN 1 aune 1986). 
A collection of authoritative U.S. statements of the legal basis for the August 
1998 cruise missile attacks on terrorist camps in Mghanistan and a chemical plant 
in Sudan, as well as other relevant materials, can be found at 93 AM. J. OF INT'L 
LAW 161-170 (1999). 
The Corfu Channel case is published at 1949 I.CJ. 4. 
The Chorzow Factory decision is published at 1928 P.C.I.]. (ser. A) No. 17. 
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The U.S. French air traffic tribunal decision is published as Case Concerning Air 
Services Agreement Between France and the United States, Arbitral Award of Decem-
ber 9,1978, UNRIAA 417,443-446. 
The International Court ofJustice decision in Nicaragua v. United States cif America 
is published at 1986 LCJ. 14. 
A statement by the State Department's Legal Advisor concerning the legal basis 
for U.S. attacks on North Vietnamese forces in Cambodia is published at 62 
DEPT OF STATE BULLETIN 765 (1970). 
Timothy Guiden has published an extensive article on U.S. operations in Cam-
bodia: Defending America's Cambodian Incursion, ARIz.]. INTL & COMP L. 217 
(1994). 
IV: SPACELAW 
The treaties cited in this section are published as follows: 
Outer Space Treaty, 18 UST 2410; TIAS 6347; 610 UNTS 205 
Rescue and Return Agreement, 19 UST 7570; TIAS 6599; 672 UNTS 119 
Liability Convention, 24 UST 2389; TIAS 7762; 961 UNTS 187 
Registration Convention, 28 UST 695; TIAS 8480; 1023 UNTS 15 
Moon Agreement, U.N. Doc. AlRES/34, 68 (1979) 
Environmental Modification Convention, 31 UST 333; TIAS 9614; 1108 
UNTS 151 
Limited Test Ban Treaty, 14 UST 1313; TIAS 5433; 480 UNTS 13 
ABM Treaty, 23 UST; TIAS 7503; 944 UNTS 13 
v. COMMUNICATIONS LAW 
At this writing in November 1999 the International Telecommunications Con-
vention of1982 has not yet been published in the USTseries, which is the State 
527 
An Assessment of International Legal Issues 
Department's official compilation of international agreements to which the 
United States is a party. This agreement is probably most accessible in 
S. TREATY DOC. No. 99-6. The United States is also a party to the Constitu-
tion and Convention of the International Telecommunications Union of1992, 
which replaces the 1982 agreement as between parties to the 1992 agreement. 
The two memorandum opinions of the Justice Department's Office of Legal 
Counsel concerning broadcasting into Haiti are entitled "Applicability of 47 
USC Section 502 to Certain Broadcast Activities" (October 15, 1993) and 
"Memorandum for the Deputy Attorney General" Guly 8, 1994). 
The 1884 Convention for Protection of Submarine Cables and associated docu-
mentsarepublishedat24Stat.989, 25 Stat. 1424, TS380, 1 Bevans 89, 112, 114. 
The major bilateral and regional communications agreements to which the 
United States is a party are listed in TREATIES IN FORCE. Many others are 
unpublished. 
VI. OTHER TREATIES 
Citations to the agreements described in this section can generally be found in 
the current TREATIES IN FORCE. Pursuant to DoD Directive 5530.3, "Interna-
tional Agreements," June 11, 1987, a DoD repository and index of unpublished 
international agreements relating to military operations and installations is main-
tained in the Office of the Deputy General Counsel (International Affairs). 
Vll. FOREIGN DOMESTIC LAWS 
None. 
VllI. IMPLICATIONS OF ESPIONAGE LAW 
None. 
IX. INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO RESTRICT "INFORMATION 
WARFARE" 
The effort by Russia in the £ill of 1998 to get the United Nations to take a firm 
stand on restricting information warfare produced only a resolution passed by the 
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General Assembly on 4 January 1999 entitled "Developments in the field of in-
fonnation and telecommunications in the context of international security," 
which "calls upon Member States to promote at multilateral levels the consider-
ation of existing and potential threats in the field ofinfonnation security," "in-
vites all Member States to infonn the Secretary-General of their views and 
assessments" on infonnation security issues, "requests the Secretary-General to 
submit a report to the General Assembly" at its next session, and "decides to in-
clude infonnation security in the provisional agenda for its next session." U.N. 
Doc. A/RES/53/70 (1999). In August 1999 the Secretary General submitted his 
report to the General Assembly. It contained the statements submitted by ten 
Member States (Australia, Belarus, Brunei, Cuba, Oman, Qatar, Russia, Saudi 
Arabia, the United Kingdom, and the United States). The Russian statement re-
ferred to "infonnation weapons ... the use of which ... can have devastating 
consequences, comparable to the effect of weapons of mass destruction." It pro-
posed that the General Assembly "adopt resolutions on the question ofinfonna-
tion security with a view to reducing the threat of the use of infonnation for 
terrorist, criminal or military purposes," which would help generate "interna-
tional principles (e.g., a regime, a code of conduct for States) with a view to 
strengthening international infonnation security," and ultimately to a "multilat-
eral international legal instrument." Aside from Russia, only Belarus and Cuba 
e}"'Pressed support for the development of international legal principles in the 
field of infonnation security other than cooperation in suppressing computer 
crime and terrorism. The United States and the United Kingdom stated that it 
was premature to attempt to fonnulate overarching principles pertaining to in-
fonnation security, and that, for the present, international efforts should focus on 
measures to combat computer crime and terrorism. The Secretary General ven-
tured no opinion on the subject. U.N. DOC. A/541213, 10 August 1999. 
x. OBSERVATIONS 
None 
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